GAME THEORETIC APPROACHES TO COMMUNICATION OVER MIMO INTERFERENCE CHANNELS IN THE PRESENCE OF A MALICIOUS JAMMER by McKell, Kenneth Clayton
GAME THEORETIC APPROACHES TO COMMUNICATION OVER MIMO
INTERFERENCE CHANNELS IN THE PRESENCE OF A MALICIOUS JAMMER
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I AT MA¯NOA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
DECEMBER 2018
By
Kenneth McKell
Dissertation Committee:
Gürdal Arslan, Chairperson
N. Thomas Gaarder
James Yee
Serdar Yüksel
Ruben Juarez
Copyright© 2018 by
Kenneth McKell
ii
To my brother, Chris, for teaching me more than I ever knew.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
“Our science, which we loved above everything, had brought us together. It appeared
to us as a flowering garden. In this garden there were well-worn paths where one might
look around at leisure and enjoy one-self without effort, especially at the side of a
congenial companion. But we also liked to seek out hidden trails and discovered many
an unexpected view which was pleasing to our eyes; and when the one pointed it out to
the other, and we admired it together, our joy was complete.”
–David Hilbert
I have had the great fortune of enjoying many companions in my journey through the garden. Some
have shown me their favorite plots and encouraged me to cultivate my own. Others have permitted
me to lead them about. Many more had only a passing interest in the garden; nonetheless they
looked after me as I traipsed about.
My committee members have been receptive to my questions and thoughtful in their answers.
Thanks are due to Jim, Tom, and Serdar for their guidance and support. I would also like to thank
Ruben for agreeing to serve on an engineering dissertation committee and for all his work fostering
the study of game theory on campus.
Much of my early graduate work was supported by NSF Grant #ECCS-0547692. I would be
remiss without thanking Gürdal and the National Science Foundation. The Man himself has shown
me the true feeling of satisfaction in work done right. Thank you, Gürdal; may you have many
happy trails in the future.
Jason Marden has—inexplicably—believed in me since we met in 2006. He has provided me
with countless opportunities throughout my graduate career, and I will forever be grateful for his
mentorship.
I consider myself immensely fortunate to have friends too numerous to acknowledge by name.
My extended ohana is filled with wonderful and thoughtful people who have played a large part in
shaping me into the person I am today.
My family was rightfully dubious of my decision to continue my studies in Hawai’i. If you ask,
they will gladly tell you how proud they are of me. Allow me to counter with how proud I am of
them: Their patience, support, and love have never wavered in the face of unimaginable setbacks.
Thank you Pam, Don, and Ann.
Lastly, I ponder where I would be without my wife, Serena. She has been by my side through
my darkest hours and during my shining moments. I can only hope that in the coming decades I
can similarly be there for her.
iv
ABSTRACT
This dissertation considers a system consisting of self-interested users of a common multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) channel and a jammer wishing to reduce the total capacity of the channel.
In this setting, two games are constructed that model different system-level objectives. In the
first—called “utility games”—the users maximize the mutual information between their transmitter
and their receiver subject to a power constraint. In the other (termed “cost games”), the users
minimize power subject to an information rate floor. A duality is established between the equilibrium
strategies in these two games, and it is shown that Nash equilibria always exist in utility games.
Via an exact penalty approach, a modified version of the cost game also possesses an equilibrium.
Additionally, multiple equilibria may exist in utility games, but with mild assumptions on users’ own
channels and the jammer-user channels, systems with no user-user interference, there can be at most
one Nash equilibrium where a user transmits on all of its subchannels. A similar but weaker result
is also found for channels with limited amounts of user-user interference. Two distributed update
processes are proposed: gradient-play and best-response. The performance of these algorithms
are compared via software simulation. Finally, previous results on network-level improvement via
stream control are shown to carry over when a jammer is introduced.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
For as long as humans have had the ability to communicate, others have desired to block that
communication. Through the millennia it has become clear that knowledge is power, and the ability
to interfere with the transmission of information can give one a leg up on the competition.
This dissertation aims to model and predict a sensible outcome when a jammer wishes to disrupt
a particular form of communication: multiple users transmitting through a common multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) channel. In so doing optimal strategies and performance lower bounds are
found for both users and jammers. We make no assumptions about who is on what “side” or what
is being communicated. We simply analyze a modern incarnation of an ancient problem. Who gets
to say what? Can they be stopped?
The contents of this dissertation are not necessarily presented chronologically; rather, they have
been arranged to give continuity to the exposition. Chapter 1 lays out the motivation and sets the
stage for the work. It then aims to give a sense of the relevant mathematical tools used. Chapter 2
builds on this foundation by describing the games used to model the systems under consideration
and provides conditions under which these games have nice properties. Chapter 3 contains both
theoretical and numerically simulated results on how the agents in these games might reach a
steady state. Finally, chapter 4 summarizes the novel results and suggests areas in which they can
be extended.
The background section in this chapter contains many concepts that are not due to this author.
To help clarify as much as possible what is novel work and what has been reprinted here for the sake
of coherence, all results that are not due to the author are labeled “Propositions.” Their proofs have
been included where instructive and omitted otherwise. The main contributions of this dissertation
are contained in the various “Theorems” and supporting “Lemmas.”
1.1 Motivation
Every day, we transmit vital information through media in which there is interference. The inter-
ference may be naturally occurring , but increasingly it is a result of the transmissions of others.
Cell phone communication, satellite transmissions, and many ad-hoc network configurations trans-
mit over these so-called interference channels. Even wire-line media—such as DSL—experiences
cross-talk between wire strands [21]. Sharing a channel means that our transmissions are subject
to myriad pitfalls including eavesdropping, spoofing, and outright jamming.
It is in this context that we present a methodology based on game theory to plan for interference
not only from self-interested neighbors but also from a malicious jammer. The theory of games
enables prediction and control of steady states in systems comprising self-interested agents with no
centralized authority.
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Many domains of communication meet this criterion. For example, one approach to open-
access spectrum sharing is a selfish distributed power allocation scheme [20]. Additionally, due to
significant latency, distributed control of satellite communications has been under development for
quite some time [48]. The survey [7] also describes the application of game theory to multiple layers
of modern wireless networks.
This dissertation is the nexus of two areas of game theoretic power control in wireless networks.
On one hand, [23] considers an interference channel with orthogonal tones in the presence of a
jammer. On the other hand, [2] treats the full (nonorthogonal) MIMO Gaussian interference channel
problem without a jammer. As far as we know, this work is the first to consider both the full MIMO
Gaussian interference channel and a jammer.
1.2 Literature Review
Wireless communication networks are proliferating and connecting an increasing number of devices.
On each device, the tendency is toward a growing quantity of transmit and receive antennas; the
resulting increase in information packed into a MIMO channel demands intelligent control. Along-
side this increase in information capacity comes a higher risk of malicious agents to disrupt the data
flow.
This work builds on research published in the fields of game theory, wireless MIMO communica-
tion, and network information theory. The existence of equilibrium points in finite non-cooperative
games was established by Nash [35,36]. Glicksberg proved the existence of Nash equilibrium points
in mixed strategies in n-person infinite games with continuous payoffs and convex strategy spaces in
[22]. The result used heavily in this work is due to Rosen in [42], where concavity of every agent’s
payoff function with respect to its own action is shown to be a sufficient condition for existence of
Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Also in [42], Rosen defines a property of games called “diagonally
strictly concave” which is sufficient to show that a game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
The communication theory employed in this work builds on the concept of information theory
due to Shannon in [46] and the resulting field [9].
Cellular telephone networks have fostered much work in optimizing wireless channels that are
many-to-one [17], and one-to-many [41]. Demirkol and Ingram [11–13] have developed centralized
algorithms to maximize total capacity in networks of MIMO communicators. The question of
whether users of the interference channel can cooperate in order to improve their performance is
pertinent here. That is, if communicators are transmitting on frequencies that interfere with each
other, perhaps they can recognize that it might be in their best interests to coordinate their efforts.
To this end, conditions for uniqueness of the Nash bargaining solution appear in [8] and dynamic
bargaining processes are presented in [31]. Our version of cooperative control to optimize system-
level performance comes in the form of an extension of the stream control approach in [2] and
appears in Section 3.3.
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Accounting for malicious jammers is a recent development in networked communications. Orig-
inating with a personal single-input single-output (SISO) channel and a single jammer, Medard [34]
derived the capacity for this two-player model. In cellular networks, equilibrium existence results
have been obtained for games between the cell tower and a jammer [15, 44]. In [29], a saddle point
is found for a game between a jammer and a MIMO communicator. More recently, existence results
have been found for multiplayer games between cellular users and a jammer [45]. These works—
especially the cellular network ones—rely heavily on the many-to-one or one-to-many paradigms
where joint encoding or decoding may be used to strengthen results.
The direct ancestors of this dissertation are the papers that combine elements from all of the
above areas. Arslan, et al. [2] proved existence and gave conditions for uniqueness of Nash equilibria
in a multiplayer MIMO game between users with no jammer. Also, [2] proposes a negotiated stream
control approach in an effort to maximize total network capacity. Later, these authors built on the
results of [39], again in the absence of a jammer, to give conditions for equilibrium existence in the
dual game where MIMO transmit power is minimized subject to communication rate requirements
[3, 4].
Finally, the orthogonal-tone multiplayer game with a jammer was shown to possess equilibria in
[23]. The research proposed herein extends this work to the general MIMO case.
1.3 Background
In this section, we provide a broad introduction into the mathematical and engineering concepts
used in this dissertation. For more in-depth treatments, the reader is referred to [19, 38] for game
theory, [9] for information theory, and [52] for communication theory.
1.3.1 Fundamentals of Game Theory
Game theory is the mathematical study of systems of self-interested agents. Many classes of games
have been identified so that their properties can be enumerated clearly.
As illustrated in Fig. 1.1, in this work we consider strategic games: those in which agents select
their strategies simultaneously. Within strategic games we are interested in multiplayer systems
(those with more than two agents) with infinite strategy sets (e.g. continua).
Components of a Game
Games of this class consist of three components: a set of agents (also called “players”), strategies
available to each agent, and an objective function for each agent.
The games we consider comprise a finite set of p agents. These agents are identified by integers
and are collectively known as the player set P = {1, 2, . . . , p}.
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Non-cooperative Games
Extensive-form
Strategic-form
Two-player finite
Two-player infinite
Multiplayer finite
Multiplayer infinite
Figure 1.1: A partial taxonomy of games. The class of games utilized in this dissertation is shown as shaded.
Each agent possesses a set of available actions. The strategy set for agent k is denoted Sk. In
general, these sets can be of any cardinality, but as mentioned above we will be considering infinite
strategy sets in this work, namely, subsets of Euclidean vector spaces. We will often find cause to
refer to the Cartesian product of all of the agents’ strategy sets,
S =
∏
k∈P
Sk, (1.1)
the set of joint strategies.
The final necessary component of a game is an objective function for each agent. Each agent
k attempts to optimize fk : S → R but is only able to control its own action. This partial control
is essential to the theory of games. As such, we will often refer to a joint action s ∈ S as the
concatenation of two elements
s = (sk, s−k) , (1.2)
where sk is the strategy employed by agent k and s−k is the collection of strategies employed by
the agents in P\{k}.
By combining these three components, the shorthand notation Γ (P,S, {fk}) refers to the game
with player set P, joint strategy set S, and set of objective functions {fk}.
Solution Concepts
There are many notions for what it means to “solve” a game. In this work we will utilize Nash
equilibria [35,36] and later generalized Nash equilibria [10].
The essence of a Nash equilibrium is that no self-interested agent would unilaterally change its
strategy if it cannot improve its objective. Likewise, no self-interested agent would fail to optimize
its objective if given the chance. We formalize this concept with the definition of an equilibrium in
non-cooperative games due to Nash [35].
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Definition 1.1 (Nash equilibrium) A Nash equilibrium of Γ (P,S, {fk}), where agents attempt
to maximize their objectives, is a joint action sˆ ∈ S such that for all k ∈ P,
fk(sˆk, sˆ−k) ≥ fk(sk, sˆ−k) ∀sk ∈ Sk. (1.3)
The definition is similar (with the inequality flipped) in games where agents attempt to minimize
their objectives.
The concept of Nash equilibrium is not applicable when the strategies available to an agent
depend on the actions of others. In this case, the strategies available to agent k when the other
agents play s−k are known as its feasible set which is denoted Sk(s−k). One can still imagine a joint
strategy and associated feasible sets in which no agent can unilaterally improve. This scenario is
known as a generalized Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.2 (Generalized Nash equilibrium) A generalized Nash equilibrium of
the maximization game Γ (P,S, {fk}) is a joint action sˆ ∈ S(sˆ) =
∏
k∈P Sk(sˆ−k) such that for
all k ∈ P,
fk(sˆk, sˆ−k) ≥ fk(sk, sˆ−k) ∀sk ∈ Sk(sˆ−k). (1.4)
The definition is similar (with the inequality flipped) in games where agents attempt to minimize
their objectives.
Observe that when the agents’ strategy sets are decoupled, generalized Nash equilibria reduce to
Nash equilibria of Definition 1.1.
An important concept related to unilateral improvement is that of best-response.
Definition 1.3 (Best-response) The best-response correspondence for agent k in the maximiza-
tion game Γ (P,S, {fk}) is a point-to-set mapping BRk : S−k ⇒ Sk where
S−k =
∏
j∈P\{k}
Sj (1.5)
and
BRk(s−k) = arg max
sk∈Sk(s−k)
fk(sk, s−k). (1.6)
The definition is similar (with arg max replaced by arg min) in minimization games.
This definition seems quite natural in that if agent k finds itself faced with the opponents’ action
s−k, the most immediate response would be to try to optimize its objective subject to this state of
the world.
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Individual agents’ best-responses can be concatenated to form the joint best-response BR : S ⇒
S where
BR(s) =

BR1(s−1)
BR2(s−2)
...
BRp(s−p)
 . (1.7)
The joint best-response is relevant to the discussion of Nash equilibria because any Nash equilibrium
must be a fixed point of BR(·). That is, sˆ is a (generalized) Nash equilibrium of a game if and only
if
sˆ ∈ BR(sˆ). (1.8)
With this observation, we can now point out that not all games possess Nash equilibria.
Example 1.1 (Leader-follower game) Consider the game with two players: the leader (player
1) and the follower (player 2). Both players have the identical strategy sets S1 = S2 = [0, 1] ⊂ R.
The leader wants to maximize the distance between itself and the follower: f1(s1, s2) = |s1 − s2|.
The follower, on the other hand, wants to maximize the opposite: f2(s1, s2) = −|s1 − s2|.
Qualitatively, the best response of the leader will be to go as far away from the follower as
possible. Conversely, given the position of the leader, the follower will elect to go exactly there.
Indeed, these correspondences can be made explicit:
BR1(s2) =

1, s2 < 0.5
{0, 1}, s2 = 0.5
0, s2 > 0.5
(1.9a)
BR2(s1) = s1 (1.9b)
These correspondences are plotted in Fig. 1.2. The relevant observation to make is that the graphs
of these two correspondences never intersect. That is, there is no (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ S1 × S2 such that
(sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ BR(sˆ1, sˆ2).
Thus, the leader-follower game does not possess a Nash equilibrium1.
Example 1.1 is important because it illustrates that even “small” games with simple strategy
sets may not possess a Nash equilibrium. In general, there is no reason to believe that larger games
with more complicated strategy sets should either.
So under what conditions are Nash equilibria guaranteed to exist? Rosen [42] described a class
called concave games that have the existence property.
1It should be pointed out that the leader-follower game has no Nash equilibria in pure strategies. As pure strategies
are the sole focus of this dissertation, we omit references to solutions in mixed strategies [19].
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0
s2
s1
1
1
BR1(s2)
BR1(s2)
B
R 2
(s
1
)
Figure 1.2: Best-response correspondences for both the leader and the follower plotted on the same axes. If s2 = 0.5,
then the leader is indifferent between 0 and 1, i.e. BR1(0.5) = {0, 1}.
Proposition 1.1 (Adapted from Theorem 1 in [42]) The p-player game
Γ(P,S, {fk}),
where
• S = S1 × · · · × Sp,
• Sk ∀k ∈ P is a convex, closed, and bounded subset of RNk for some positive integer Nk, and
• fk(sk, s−k) is continuous in (sk, s−k) and concave in sk for all k ∈ P,
possesses a Nash equilibrium.
To investigate when concave games have a unique equilibrium, Rosen went on to develop the con-
cept of diagonally strictly concave payoffs. He showed that it is a sufficient condition for uniqueness
in concave games.
For a vector of nonnegative weights r ∈ Rp+, denote the weighted sum of payoffs in a concave
game by
σ(s, r) =
∑
k∈P
rkfk(s). (1.10)
Definition 1.4 (Pseudogradient) The pseudogradient g(s, r) of σ(s, r) is the vector of gradients
of each agent’s payoff function with respect to its own strategy:
g(s, r) =

r1∇s1f1(s)
r2∇s2f2(s)
...
rp∇spfp(s)
 . (1.11)
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Definition 1.5 (Diagonally strictly concave) The function σ(·, r) is diagonally strictly concave
for fixed r ∈ Rp+ if for every s1 6= s0 ∈ S
(s0 − s1)ᵀ g(s1, r) + (s1 − s0)ᵀ g(s0, r) > 0. (1.12)
This definition is critical in confirming when a concave game has a unique equilibrium. However,
checking whether a game satisfies Definition 1.5 can be an onerous task. Fortunately, Rosen also
provides a sufficient condition for diagonal strict concavity that is usually much easier to verify.
Proposition 1.2 (Adapted from Theorem 6 in [42]) A sufficient condition that the function
σ(s, r) be diagonally strictly concave for s ∈ S and fixed r ∈ Rp++ is
G(s, r) +G(s, r)ᵀ ≺ 0 ∀s ∈ S, (1.13)
where G(s, r) is the Jacobian of g(s, r):
G(s, r) =
[
∂g(s,r)
∂s1
∂g(s,r)
∂s2
· · · ∂g(s,r)∂sp
]
. (1.14)
The full name “Jacobian of the pseudogradient” is cumbersone, so we elect to use the nonstandard
term pseudohessian to refer to the G(s, r) matrix. We will often make use of the pseudogradient of
a game and its Jacobian without the reference to a general weight vector, r. To simplify notation,
we adopt the convention that the omission of a second argument implies
g(s) = g(s,1) (1.15a)
G(s) = G(s,1). (1.15b)
Furthermore, we will often need to refer to the the symmetrized version of the pseudohessian which
is denoted
G¯(s) = G(s) +G (ᵀs). (1.16)
With these classifications, the background material on game theory can conclude with Rosen’s
result on uniqueness.
Proposition 1.3 (Adapted from Theorem 2 in [42]) If σ(s, r) is diagonally strictly concave
for some r ∈ Rp++, then the equilibrium point guaranteed by Proposition 1.1 is unique.
1.3.2 Fundamentals of Communication and Information Theories
The theories of communication and information are intimately intertwined. We largely lump them
together, but a convenient distinction is that communication engineering deals with the “how” we
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transmit, and information theory is the study of “what” we transmit. A quick review of the sliver
of these fields used in this work follows.
Information and Entropy
In order to quantify information and optimize its communication, we rely on the framework of
information theory developed by Shannon [46].
Unless otherwise specified, log refers to the base e logarithm and information entropy is measured
in nats. Let x be a vector-valued continuous random variable with support set X .
Definition 1.6 (Entropy) The entropy of a continuous random variable x with density p(·) is
h(x) = −
∫
X
p(ξ) log p(ξ) dξ. (1.17)
The entropy of a random variable is a quantification of its uncertainty. When considering the
relative uncertainty between two distributions, relative entropy is the appropriate metric.
Definition 1.7 (Relative entropy) The relative entropy between two densities p(·) and q(·) of a
random variable x is
D(p||q) =
∫
p(ξ) log
p(ξ)
q(ξ)
dξ, (1.18)
where the integral is performed over the support of x under p and we define 0 log 00 = 0.
The definition of entropy can be extended to cover joint and conditional random variables.
Definition 1.8 (Joint entropy) The joint entropy of n random variables x1, x2, . . . , xn with sup-
port set X n and joint distribution pn(·) is
h(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = −
∫
Xn
pn(ξ) log pn(ξ) dξ. (1.19)
Definition 1.9 (Conditional entropy) For two random variables x and y with supports X and
Y, joint distribution px,y(·, ·), and conditional distribution px|y(·|·), the conditional entropy of x on
y is
h(x|y) = −
∫
X×Y
px,y(ξ, γ) log px|y(ξ|γ) dξ dγ. (1.20)
Finally, the reduction in uncertainty of one random variable based on the knowledge of another
is termed their mutual information.
Definition 1.10 (Mutual information) The mutual information between two random variables
x and y with joint distribution px,y(·, ·) and marginals px(·) and py(·) is
I(x; y) =
∫
px,y(ξ, γ) log
px,y(ξ, γ)
px(ξ)py(γ)
dξ dγ, (1.21)
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n
Figure 1.3: The AWGN channel model. A message m is encoded and enters the channel as transmission x where it
encounters additive Gaussian noise n. The decoder acts on received signal y.
where the integral is performed over the joint support.
It is often useful to express mutual information as the difference in entropies. Using the defini-
tions above, one can see that
I(x; y) = h(x)− h(x|y) (1.22)
= h(y)− h(y|x) (1.23)
= h(x) + h(y)− h(x, y) (1.24)
= D (px,y(·, ·)||px(·)py(·)) . (1.25)
A helpful interpretation of (1.22) is that I(x; y) represents the reduction in uncertainty in x due to
knowing y.
SISO Communication over Gaussian Channels
The additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel model is used to model the sending of infor-
mation from a transmitter to a receiver. As illustrated in Fig. 1.3, the model consists of a message
source, M, which periodically emits a message m ∈ M according to a distribution piM(·). The
only assumptions we place onM and piM(·) are that they conform to the Source-Channel Coding
Theorem [9, Theorem 7.13.1]. This allows us, without loss of optimality, to consider only the task
of encoding for the AWGN channel and leave the job of source coding (compression) to someone
else.
Before message m is transmitted, it is encoded with the mapping c :M→ X ⊆ Cn. The choice
of c(·) and the distribution of the vectors x in the codebook X it sends through the channel are
critical to the performance of the system, and will be discussed in the MIMO subsection.
10
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Figure 1.4: The MIMO AWGN channel model. In this instance, Nt = 3 and Nr = 2.
MIMO Communication over Gaussian Channels
When the transmitter and receiver have multiple antennae, the channel is said to be multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO). The multiple paths that information streams can travel are referred to
as subchannels. When there are an equal number of receivers as transmitters and when there is no
interference between subchannels, they are orthogonal.
In general, however, the channel inputs may interfere with each other (constructively or destruc-
tively). Therefore the single-user time-invariant memoryless MIMO AWGN channel is modeled as
the linear system
y = Hx+ n. (1.26)
As in the SISO channel, n is an additive complex random vector of dimension Nr. The (i, j)
component ofH ∈ CNr×Nt represents the gain (or attenuation) and phase shift between transmission
xj and received signal yi. The channel is presented pictorially in Fig. 1.4.
In order to derive an optimal codebook for the MIMO channel, we first present the result that
the entropy of any random vector with a given covariance is maximized when that vector has a
Gaussian distribution.
First, a lemma.
Lemma 1.4 Let p and q be two probability density functions on the complex random n-vector x
such that
∫
xp(x) dx =
∫
xq(x) dx = 0 and
∫
xix
∗
jp(x) dx =
∫
xix
∗
jq(x) dx for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Also,
let A be a quadratic form on Cn (i.e. A : Cn → R such that A(x) = x†Ax+ c, c ∈ R). Then∫
A(x)p(x) dx =
∫
A(x)q(x) dx. (1.27)
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Proof Expand the first integral:∫
A(x)p(x) dx =
∫
p(x)
(
x†Ax+ c
)
dx (1.28)
=
∫
p(x)
c+ n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xiAijx
∗
j
 dx (1.29)
= c
∫
p(x) dx+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aij
∫
p(x)xix
∗
j dx (1.30)
= c
∫
q(x) dx+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aij
∫
q(x)xix
∗
j dx (1.31)
=
∫
A(x)q(x) dx. (1.32)
2
Proposition 1.5 (Gaussian maximizes entropy) If the random vector x ∈ Cn has zero mean
and covariance K = Exx†, then
h(x) ≤ 1
2
log ((2pie)n detK) (1.33)
with equality if and only if x ∼ CN (0,K).
Proof (from [9] and [37]) Let φK(·) be the CN (0,K) probability density function. Now, to
prove the claim, recognize that log φK(x) is a quadratic form as in Lemma 1.4:
φK(x) =
e−
1
2
x†K−1x√
(2pi)n detK
(1.34)
log φK(x) = −1
2
x†K−1x− 1
2
log ((2pi)n detK) , (1.35)
which is in the form x†Ax + c. Let φˆ(·) be any density that satisfies the statistical requirements:∫
φˆ(x)x dx = 0 and
∫
φˆ(x)xix
∗
j dx = Kij = Exix
∗
j for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. By Jensen’s inequality,
0 ≤ D(φˆ||φK) (1.36)
=
∫
φˆ(x) log
φˆ(x)
φK(x)
dx (1.37)
=
∫
φˆ(x) log φˆ(x)−
∫
φˆ(x) log φK(x) dx (1.38)
= −h(φˆ)−
∫
φK(x) log φK(x) dx (1.39)
= −h(φˆ) + h(φK), (1.40)
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where (1.39) is a direct application of Lemma 1.4. Thus no zero-mean distribution with covariance
K can beat CN (0,K) in terms of entropy. 2
Proposition 1.5 appears in [9, Theorem 8.6.5] for real random variables and was generalized to
the complex domain by Neeser and Massey [37]. Lemma 1.4 is referenced in [9] but is not explicitly
proven.
In the interest of compactness, we will often refer to complex random variables as Gaussian as
shorthand for circularly symmetric complex Gaussian.
Proposition 1.5 is critical in the development of the communication model used in this work.
In particular, it is used in Proposition 1.6 to show that when faced with Gaussian noise, there is
no better codebook than a Gaussian. Conversely, Proposition 1.6 also indicates that the noise—or
more generally any source of interference—cannot be a larger source of additive disruption than if
it too is Gaussian.
Proposition 1.6 (from [9, pp. 298]) Given a MIMO additive noise channel with the following
constraints:
Ex = 0 ∈ CN Exx† = Kx (1.41a)
En = 0 ∈ CN Enn† = Kn, (1.41b)
and x independent of n, then the distributions xˆ ∼ CN (0,Kx) and nˆ ∼ CN (0,Kn) represent a
saddle-point equilibrium of the game where player 1 picks the distribution of x to maximize I(x;x+n)
and player 2 picks the distribution of n to minimize I(x;x+ n).
Proof Let n = nˆ. The difference that player 1 sees if it switches away from xˆ to x is
I(x;x+ nˆ)− I(xˆ; xˆ+ nˆ) = h(x+ nˆ)− h(nˆ)− h(xˆ+ nˆ) + h(nˆ) (1.42)
= h(x+ nˆ)− h(xˆ+ nˆ) (1.43)
≤ 0, (1.44)
where (1.44) is a direct application of Proposition 1.5. That is, xˆ + nˆ is Gaussian with zero mean
and variance Kx +Kn, so no other distribution for x+ nˆ can have entropy larger than h(xˆ+ nˆ).
Now consider the payoff to player 2 in response to xˆ:
I(xˆ; xˆ+ n) = h(xˆ+ n)− h(xˆ+ n|xˆ) (1.45)
= h(xˆ+ n)− h(n), (1.46)
where the first line is simply the definition of mutual information, and the second is due to the
independence of n and xˆ.
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The entropy power inequality [49] states that for any two independent random vectors x and n,
e
2
N
h(x+n) ≥ e 2N h(x) + e 2N h(n), (1.47)
with equality if x and n are Gaussian. Equation (1.47) is equivalent to
h(x+ n) ≥ N
2
log
(
e
2
N
h(x) + e
2
N
h(n)
)
. (1.48)
Applying the entropy power inequality, we can continue from (1.46):
h(xˆ+ n)− h(n) ≥ N
2
log
(
e
2
N
h(xˆ) + e
2
N
h(n)
)
− h(n) (1.49)
=
N
2
[
log
(
e
2
N
h(xˆ) + e
2
N
h(n)
)
− log e 2N h(n)
]
(1.50)
=
N
2
log
(
1 +
e
2
N
h(xˆ)
e
2
N
h(n)
)
(1.51)
≥ N
2
log
(
1 +
e
2
N
h(xˆ)
e
2
N
h(nˆ)
)
(1.52)
=
N
2
log
(
e
2
N
h(xˆ) + e
2
N
h(nˆ)
)
− h(nˆ) (1.53)
= h(xˆ+ nˆ)− h(nˆ) (1.54)
= I(xˆ; xˆ+ nˆ), (1.55)
where (1.52) must be true because the function
ga(ξ) =
N
2
log
(
1 +
a
e
2
N
ξ
)
(1.56)
is nonincreasing for all a ≥ 0 and N ≥ 1 as illustrated in Fig. 1.5.
Therefore player 2 can also do no better than the Gaussian distribution. 2
Proposition 1.6 justifies the use of the AWGN channel model throughout this dissertation. That
is, if the covariance-limited signal is independent from the covariance-limited Gaussian noise, then
all codebooks are dominated by Gaussian ones. Likewise, Gaussian codebooks face their largest
challenge when confronted with additive Gaussian noise.
The capacity—the maximum amount of information that can travel through a channel with
arbitrarily small probability of decoding error—was derived by Telatar [51].
Proposition 1.7 (Adapted from [51]) The capacity of the AWGN channel (1.26) where the
transmitter is restricted by an average power constraint c¯ is achieved by a zero-mean Gaussian
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Figure 1.5: The monotonic function ga(·) as in (1.56) parameterized by various a ∈ R+ with N = 2 .
codebook with a covariance that is unitarily similar to
Q˜ = diag
([(
µ− λ1(H†H)
)+
, · · · ,
(
µ− λNt(H†H)
)+])
, (1.57)
where µ > 0 is chosen to satisfy Tr Q˜ = c¯. The capacity achieved is
Nt∑
i=1
(
log(µλi(H
†H))
)+
. (1.58)
Proposition 1.7 complements Proposition 1.6 by assuring that when faced with an AWGN chan-
nel, the transmitter can achieve its maximum mutual information (with a Gaussian codebook).
Additionally, Proposition 1.7 exhibits a salient feature in the transmitter’s optimization problem:
the selection of Q˜ is done via a water-filling process. That is, the convex maximization over the cone
of all Nt ×Nt positive semidefinite covariance matrices reduces to a scalar optimization problem.
MIMO Interference Channels
As a final layer in the foundation, we must model multiple users communicating through the same
MIMO channel. That is, multiple copies of Fig. 1.4 all transmitting into the same medium and
interfering with each other. We refer to this situation as a MIMO interference channel; in the
literature it is sometimes also called the multi-user MIMO (MU-MIMO) model.
Figure 1.6 is a graphical representation of the interference channel. Each xk is an encoded vector
transmission intended to be decoded from received vector yk. The matrices Hk,k each correspond
to matrix H in (1.26). The matrices Hj,k, j 6= k are the the gains on transmission xj seen as
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x1 H1,1 + y1
n1
H2,1
x2 H2,2 + y2
n2
H1,2
x0
H1,0
H2,0
Figure 1.6: The MIMO interference channel with two users and one jammer.
interference by user k.
The noise vectors nk are all assumed to be mutually independent with circularly symmetric
Gaussian distributions. Via normalization, we can take Enkn
†
k = I.
Each user’s received signal is then
yk = Hk,kxk +
∑
j∈P\{k}
Hk,jxj + nk. (1.59)
Figure 1.6 is a pictorial representation of signal flow in a two-user-plus-jammer system. Note that
there is no modeled receiver for the jammer’s transmissions (x0), and that the jammer’s transmission
is not customized for each user. Furthermore, in this model, the received signals y1 and y2 are
decoded separately. We do not consider the joint decoding scheme in this work.
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CHAPTER 2
GAMES ON MIMO INTERFERENCE CHANNELS
For users of an interference channel, there are at least two possible paradigms of operation.
One can imagine users selecting codes to achieve the maximum amount of information through
the channel under the constraint that the codebook they employ is subject to an average power
constraint. This seems plausible if the power source at the transmitter is rechargeable and there is
little or no on-board memory storage. Then it would be in the transmitter’s best interest to pass
on any data collected as quickly as possible. On the other hand, it is completely reasonable that
users may wish to minimize their power consumption so long as their information can get through
the channel at an acceptable rate. Such a paradigm might come into play in the context of remote
sensing devices with finite power banks and uniform data transmissions.
2.1 Dual Games
We model the paradigms mentioned above as dual games to reflect their distinct but related struc-
tures and objectives.
We consider a network comprising r self-interested users and a single malicious jammer. We
identify the users with the integers 1, . . . , r, and collectively refer to the set of users as
R = {1, . . . , r}. (2.1)
The jammer is identified as agent 0, and the collection of all p = r + 1 agents in the system is the
set
P = {0} ∪ R. (2.2)
Each agent comprises one transmit/receive pair—except for the jammer, for which it is not necessary
to model a receiver—as in Fig. 1.6. Without loss of generality, let each agent possess Nt and Nr
transmit and receive antennas, respectively.
In light of the results in Section 1.3.2, the strategy set for each agent k ∈ P is the cone of
positive semidefinite matrices
Sk = HNt+ (2.3)
representing covariance matrices for their zero-mean Gaussian codebooks, and the joint strategy set
is
S = S0 × · · · × Sr. (2.4)
To apply Rosen’s theorems on concave games played over real strategy sets, we will frequently
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view Nt-dimensional Hermitian matrices as real 2N2t vectors using the reshaping for X ∈ HNt ,
−→
X =
[
vec (ReX)
vec (ImX)
]
∈ R2N2t , (2.5)
where vec(·) is the standard vectorization operator that vertically concatenates the columns of its
argument.
Additionally, let each user k have a utility function equal to the mutual information between its
transmitter and receiver, which, for the Gaussian interference channel, can be derived from (1.59)
to be
uk(Q) = log
∣∣∣(I +R−1/2k (Q)Hk,kQkH†k,kR−1/2k (Q))∣∣∣ , (2.6)
where Rk(·) is the noise-plus-interference from agents other than k:
Rk(Q) = I +
∑
j∈P\{k}
Hk,jQjH
†
k,j . (2.7)
Similarly, each user has a cost function
ck(Qk) = TrQk (2.8)
that represents the power needed to employ a Gaussian codebook with covariance Qk  0.
Before proceeding, we identify some properties of the utility function uk(·) that will be useful
later. First, uk(Qk, Q−k) is continuous in both arguments (i.e. it is continuous throughout S). It
is also well-known to be concave on Sk and evaluates to zero whenever Qk = 0 ∈ HNt , the “zero
action.” Further, uk(αQk, Q−k) is monotonic in α according to the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 For any Q ∈ S and any k ∈ R the function f(α) = uk(αQk, Q−k) is monotonically
nondecreasing for α ∈ R+. If Qk  0 and rankHk,k = Nt, this property can be strengthened to
strictly increasing.
Proof Pick an arbitrary Q ∈ S, k ∈ R, and real α > β. An equivalent formulation of the utility
in (2.6) is
uk(Q) = log |Ak(Q)| − log |Rk(Q)| (2.9)
where
Ak(Q) = Rk(Q) +Hk,kQkH
†
k,k. (2.10)
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Since Rk(Q) is invariant to scaling on Qk, this formulation of the utility allows us to write
f(α)− f(β) = log |Ak (αQk, Q−k)| − log |Ak (βQk, Q−k)| . (2.11)
Thus the question of the sign of f(α) − f(β) reduces to comparing the product of the eigenvalues
of two Ak matrices. However, since
Ak (αQk, Q−k)−Ak (βQk, Q−k) = (α− β)Hk,kQkH†k,k (2.12)
 0, (2.13)
Weyl’s inequality [6, Theorem 8.4.9] tells us that λi (Ak (αQk, Q−k)) ≥ λi (Ak (βQk, Q−k)) for all
i = 1, . . . , Nt and therfore f(·) is nondecreasing.
Under the stronger conditions, Hk,kQkH
†
k,k  0 and Weyl’s inequality guarantees a strict in-
equality λi (Ak (αQk, Q−k)) > λi (Ak (βQk, Q−k)) for at least one i = 1, . . . , Nt which ensures f(·)
is increasing. 2
2.1.1 Utility Games
In the paradigm where users strive to maximize their link’s mutual information subject to a power
constraint c¯ ∈ Rp+, the feasible strategy set for user k ∈ R is
Uk(c¯k) = {Qk ∈ Sk : ck(Qk) ≤ c¯k}. (2.14)
The jammer, however, strives to minimize the total mutual information across the network. This
is equivalent to maximizing
Ju(Q) = −
∑
k∈R
uk(Q) (2.15)
subject to a feasible strategy set
U0(c¯0) = {Q0 ∈ S0 : pu(Q0) ≤ c¯0}, (2.16)
pu(Q0) = Tr(Q0). (2.17)
Note that the agents’ strategy sets are decoupled in this paradigm so that the joint strategy set
U(c¯) =
∏
k∈P
Uk(c¯k) (2.18)
is invariant to the strategies chosen by the agents.
Using the terminology of Section 1.3.1, we define the utility game with constraint vector c¯ as
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the tuple
Γu(c¯) = (P,U(c¯), {Ju(Q), u1(Q), . . . , ur(Q)}) . (2.19)
This notation may at first seem cumbersome (especially the incongruous notation for the jam-
mer). However, it allows us to speak of utility games where all agents are maximizers rather than
making exceptions for the jammer in later discussion.
2.1.2 Cost Games
In the dual system where users wish to minimize their power consumption while maintaining min-
imum rates u¯ ∈ Rr+, the feasible strategy sets are now coupled vis-a-vis the actions of the other
transmitters in the channel. We write the feasible strategy set for user k ∈ R as
Ck(u¯k, Q−k) = {Qk ∈ Sk : uk(Qk, Q−k) ≥ u¯k}. (2.20)
The role of the jammer in this system bears some consideration. In constructing this dual game,
it is natural to “flip” the jammer’s objective and constraint functions as we have done for the other
channel users. However, studies of radio-frequency jammers indicate that, at least in the IEEE
802.11 Wi-Fi [25] and terrestrial multi-hop network [47] application domains, jammers are more
concerned with rate reduction than power conservation. As such, the jammer’s objective is to again
minimize
Jc(Q) = −Ju(Q) (2.21)
within the feasible strategy set
C0(u¯0) = {Q0 ∈ S0 : pc(Q0) ≥ u¯0}, (2.22)
pc(Q0) = −pu(Q0) ≤ 0. (2.23)
Unlike in the utility game, the users’ strategy sets are coupled through their actions. That is, the
joint strategy set
C(u¯, Q) = C0(u¯0)×
∏
k∈R
Ck(u¯k, Q−k) (2.24)
is not invariant to the strategies the agents employ.
Given a vector of minimum constraints, u¯ ∈ R− × Rr+, we denote the cost game as the tuple
Γc(u¯) = (P, C(u¯, Q), {Jc(Q), c1(Q1), . . . , cr(Qr)}) . (2.25)
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2.2 Existence of Equilibria
As noted in Example 1.1, not all games possess a Nash equilibrium. In this section, we explore
under what conditions the utility and cost games have equilibria. To this end, define the (possibly
empty) set of Nash equilibria of Γu(c¯) and Γc(u¯) as
Eu(c¯) =
{
Qˆ ∈ S : uk(Qˆ) ≥ uk(Qk, Qˆ−k) ∀Qk ∈ Uk(c¯k), k = 1, . . . , r,
Ju(Qˆ) ≥ Ju(Q0, Qˆ−0) ∀Q0 ∈ U0(c¯0)
}
(2.26)
Ec(u¯) =
{
Qˆ ∈ S : ck(Qˆk) ≤ ck(Qk) ∀Qk ∈ Ck(u¯k, Qˆ−k), k = 1, . . . , r,
Jc(Qˆ) ≤ Jc(Q0, Qˆ−0) ∀Q0 ∈ C0(u¯o)
}
, (2.27)
respectively. In both paradigms, the notation Γu(·) and Γc(·) obscures the channel behavior on
which the game is played. This is a shortcoming of the compact game notation. In later sections
we will place restrictions on the channel matrices {Hk,j}(k,j)∈R×P in order to prove properties of
the game comprised of objective functions that are dependent on these channel matrices.
Theorem 2.2 For any vector of costs, c¯ ∈ Rp+, the utility game Γu(c¯) possesses a Nash equilibrium.
Proof For all k ∈ P, c¯k ≥ 0 implies that the strategy set Uk(c¯k) ⊂ Sk is compact, convex, and
nonempty. As observed above, uk(Qk, Q−k) is continuous in Q and concave in Qk for all k ∈ R.
As the sum of continuous functions, Ju(Q0, Q−0) is also continuous in Q. We now consider the
concavity of Ju(Q0, Q−0) with respect to Q0. For each k ∈ R, rewrite user k’s utility as in (2.9)
and let
fk(t) = uk(Q0 + t∆Q0, Q−0) (2.28)
for some Q0 ∈ U0(c¯0), some ∆Q0 6= 0 ∈ HNt , and t ∈ [0, ε] such that Q0 + t∆Q0  0. Substituting
Vk = Hk,0∆Q0H
†
k,0 into (2.28) yields
fk(t) = log |Ak + tVk| − log |Rk + tVk| (2.29)
= log
∣∣∣I + tA−1/2k VkA−1/2k ∣∣∣+ log |Ak| − log ∣∣∣I + tR−1/2k VkR−1/2k ∣∣∣− log |Rk| , (2.30)
where Rk = I +
∑
j∈P\{k}Hk,jQjH
†
k,j and Ak = Rk + Hk,kQkH
†
k,k. For the terms that include t,
expand the determinants in terms of their eigenvalues:
fk(t) =
Nt∑
i=1
log
(
1 + t λi
(
A
−1/2
k VkA
−1/2
k
))
− log
(
1 + t λi
(
R
−1/2
k VkR
−1/2
k
))
+ log |Ak| − log |Rk| . (2.31)
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In order to determine its concavity, the first and second derivatives of fk are
f ′k(t) =
Nt∑
i=1
λi
(
A
−1/2
k VkA
−1/2
k
)
1 + t λi
(
A
−1/2
k VkA
−1/2
k
) − λi
(
R
−1/2
k VkR
−1/2
k
)
1 + t λi
(
R
−1/2
k VkR
−1/2
k
) (2.32)
f ′′k (t) =
Nt∑
i=1
−λ2i
(
A
−1/2
k VkA
−1/2
k
)
[
1 + t λi
(
A
−1/2
k VkA
−1/2
k
)]2 + λ2i
(
R
−1/2
k VkR
−1/2
k
)
[
1 + t λi
(
R
−1/2
k VkR
−1/2
k
)]2 . (2.33)
The second derivative at t = 0 is
f ′′k (0) = −Tr
(
A
−1/2
k VkA
−1
k VkA
−1/2
k
)
+ Tr
(
R
−1/2
k VkR
−1
k VkR
−1/2
k
)
. (2.34)
By expanding and using the circular property of the trace, this is equivalent to
f ′′k (0) = Tr
(
R
−1/2
k VkR
−1
k VkR
−1/2
k
)
− Tr
(
R
−1/2
k VkA
−1
k VkR
−1/2
k
)
+
Tr
(
A
−1/2
k VkR
−1
k VkA
−1/2
k
)
− Tr
(
A
−1/2
k VkA
−1
k VkA
−1/2
k
)
. (2.35)
Finally, these terms can be combined and compared:
f ′′k (0) = Tr
(
R
−1/2
k Vk
(
R−1k −A−1k
)
VkR
−1/2
k
)
+ Tr
(
A
−1/2
k Vk
(
R−1k −A−1k
)
VkA
−1/2
k
)
(2.36)
≥ 0, (2.37)
where (2.36) can be seen by noting that for positive definite Ak and Rk, Ak  Rk if and only if
A−1k  R−1k and therefore R−1k − A−1k  0. The nonnegativity of f ′′k (0) demonstrates that for all
k ∈ R, uk is convex with respect to Q0. Since Ju(Q0, Q−0) is the negative sum of functions that are
convex in Q0, we have that Ju is concave with respect to Q0. Thus the existence result for concave
games in Proposition 1.1 applies. 2
The same results apply if the jammer instead employs a weighted sum of the individual users’
mutual information as its utility.
Corollary 2.3 The existence results of Theorem 2.2 hold if the jammer’s utility is defined as a
weighted sum of the users’ utilities:
Juν (Q) = −
∑
k∈R
νkuk(Q), (2.38)
where the weights νk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ R.
The existence of Nash equilibria in utility games without jammers first appeared in [2, Propo-
sition 3.1]. The result was also shown in [23] when all agents (including the jammer) are restricted
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to orthogonal subchannel strategies (diagonal positive semidefinite matrices). The novelty of The-
orem 2.2 lies in the merging of these two settings.
We have shown that Eu(c¯), the set of joint actions that constitute a Nash equilibrium of Γu(c¯),
is nonempty for all c¯ ∈ Rp+. The analogous question for Ec(u¯) is more complex. In this case the
strategy sets Ck(u¯k), k ∈ R, depend on other agents’ actions, and are in general not bounded, so
the proof method for Theorem 2.2 no longer applies. Fortunately, the duality result in [4] can be
extended to accommodate the presence of a jammer.
Theorem 2.4 Fix Q¯ ∈ S and define u¯ and c¯ as
u¯ =
(
pc(Q¯0), u1(Q¯), . . . , ur(Q¯)
)
(2.39a)
c¯ =
(
pu(Q¯0), c1(Q¯1), . . . , cr(Q¯r)
)
. (2.39b)
Then
Q¯ ∈ Ec(u¯) ⇐⇒ Q¯ ∈ Eu(c¯). (2.40)
Proof First, suppose Q¯ 6∈ Eu(c¯). Then there are two cases:
(i) for at least one user k ∈ R, there is some Qˆk ∈ Sk such that uk(Qˆk, Q¯−k) > uk(Q¯) and
ck(Qˆk) ≤ c¯k or
(ii) there is some Qˆ0 ∈ S0 such that Ju(Qˆ0, Q¯−0) > Ju(Q¯) and pu(Qˆ0) ≤ c¯0.
If (i) is the case for user k ∈ R, then the strict inequality guarantees that Qˆk 6= 0. Thus for
some scaling factor 0 < α < 1, ck(αQˆk) < ck(Q¯k) and uk(αQˆk, Q¯−k) ≥ u¯k which implies Q¯ cannot
be an equilibrium of the cost game: Q¯ 6∈ Ec(u¯).
Otherwise, (ii) is the case and by definition Jc(Qˆ0, Q¯−0) < Jc(Q¯). Likewise, pu(Qˆ0) ≤ c¯0 implies
pc(Qˆ0) ≥ −c¯0 = u¯0. Thus Q¯ 6∈ Ec(u¯).
For the converse, suppose Q¯ 6∈ Ec(u¯). Again there are two cases:
(i) for at least one user k ∈ R, there is some Qˆk ∈ Sk such that ck(Qˆk) < ck(Q¯k) and
uk(Qˆk, Q¯−k) ≥ u¯k or
(ii) there is some Qˆ0 ∈ S0 such that Jc(Qˆ0, Q¯−0) < Jc(Q¯) and pc(Qˆ0) ≥ u¯0.
If (i) is the case for user k ∈ R, then by Lemma 2.1 there is a scaling factor α > 1 such that
ck(αQˆk) ≤ ck(Q¯k) = c¯k and uk(αQˆk, Q¯−k) > uk(Q¯) = u¯k which implies Q¯ cannot be an equilibrium
of the utility game: Q¯ 6∈ Eu(c¯).
Otherwise, (ii) is the case and by definition Ju(Qˆ0, Q¯−0) > Ju(Q¯) and pu(Qˆ0) ≤ −u¯0 = c¯0.
Again this implies Q¯ 6∈ Eu(c¯). 2
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The existence result in Theorem 2.4 is not as strong as that in Theorem 2.2. In particular,
it cannot be said that Γc(u¯) has a generalized Nash equilibrium for all u¯ ∈ R− × Rr+. What
can be concluded, however, is that some cost games do indeed possess equilibria. Specifically,
equilibria exist in cost games constrained by a u¯—as defined in (2.39a)—that can be achieved at
the equilibrium of Γu(c¯) for some c¯ ∈ Rp+.
2.3 Uniqueness of Equilibria
The classical tool for showing uniqueness of equilibrium in concave games is to employ Rosen’s
sufficient condition for diagonal strict concavity. His sufficient condition requires the symmetrized
pseudohessian matrix be negative definite when evaluated at any point in the joint action set. The
utility game does not meet this (rather restrictive) sufficient condition. Furthermore, even utility
games with “nice” channel structure—invertible user and jammer-user matrices with no inter-user
interference—may fail to meet Definition 1.5.
Example 2.1 Consider the utility game with r = 2 and channel matrices
H1,1 = H2,2 =
[
0.9 0
0 0.1
]
H1,0 = H2,0 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
H1,2 = H2,1 =
[
0 0
0 0
]
.
Let the power budgets be c¯1 =, c¯2 = 6 and c¯0 = 2. If joint action Q0 comprises the agent actions
Q01 =
[
0.0940 −0.0082 + 0.0025
−0.0082− 0.0025 0.0008
]
Q02 =
[
4.4269 1.7820− 1.8599
1.7820 + 1.8599 1.4988
]
Q00 =
[
0.0950 −0.1567 + 0.1078
−0.1567− 0.1078 0.3808
]
,
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and joint action Q1 comprises the agent actions
Q11 =
[
0.1130 0.0153 + 0.1142
0.0153− 0.1142 0.1175
]
Q12 =
[
0.9980 0.2625 + 0.2251
0.2625− 0.2251 0.1198
]
Q10 =
[
0.8083 −0.5297− 0.7751
−0.5297 + 0.7751 1.0904
]
,
then the check on diagonal strict concavity is
(−→
Q1 −−→Q0
)ᵀ
g(Q0) +
(−→
Q0 −−→Q1
)ᵀ
g(Q1) = −1.1367,
which violates Definition 1.5.
Under certain circumstances, however, utility games can be shown to adhere to the spirit of
Rosen’s uniqueness proof. That is, under certain conditions, the set of joint actions in a utility
game that satisfy the KKT optimality conditions outlined in Rosen’s proof is a singleton. To
see under which conditions this claim is true, we must devote exposition to the structure of the
pseudohessian matrix in the context of the utility game.
Defined for a general game in (1.14), the pseudohessian matrix G(Q) for a utility game is
composed of blocks Gk,j(Q) where
Gk,j(Q) = ∇−→Qj∇−→Qkuk(Q), ∀(k, j) ∈ R× P, (2.41a)
G0,j(Q) = ∇−→Qj∇−→Q0J
u(Q), ∀j ∈ P. (2.41b)
From an analytical point of view, these blocks fall into five regions according to their subscripts and
by extension their location within the pseudohessian. We now proceed to derive the second-order
derivatives that populate the pseudohessian and refer to the numbered regions in Fig. 2.1 to describe
their placement in the large matrix.
To accomplish this we first need expressions for the components of the pseudogradient. First
consider Duk(Q;Zk), the directional derivative of user k’s utility when its own action deviates in
the direction of Hermitian matrix Zk:
Duk(Q;Zk) = d
dt
uk(Qk + tZk, Q−k)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
(2.42)
=
d
dt
log
∣∣∣Ak(Q) + tHk,kZkH†k,k∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
t=0
(2.43)
= TrA−1k (Q)Hk,kZkH
†
k,k (2.44)
= TrH†k,kA
−1
k (Q)Hk,kZk. (2.45)
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I III
IV II
V
Figure 2.1: A graphical representation of the pseudohessian, G(Q). In region I are the Hessian matrices of the form
∇−→
Qk
∇−→
Qk
uk(Q), k ∈ R. Region II is the (0,0) block: ∇−→Q0∇−→Q0J
u(Q). Region III contains the blocks of deriviatives of
the pseudogradient with respect to the jammer’s action: ∇−→
Q0
∇−→
Qk
uk(Q) Region IV contains the blocks of derivatives
of the jammer’s pseudogradient with respect to user k’s action: ∇−→
Qk
∇−→
Q0
Ju(Q). Finally, region V (both above and
below the diagonal) contains blocks of the form ∇−→
Qj
∇−→
Qk
uk(Q), j 6= k ∈ R.
We use Proposition A.1 to identify
∇−→
Qk
uk(Q) =
−−−−−−−−−−−−→
H†k,kA
−1
k (Q)Hk,k. (2.46)
The last pseudogradient component is identified from the directional derivative of the jammer’s
utility with respect to its own action:
DJu(Q;Z0) = d
dt
Ju(Q0 + tZ0, Q−0)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
(2.47)
= −
∑
k∈R
d
dt
[
log
∣∣∣Ak(Q) + tHk,0Z0H†k,0∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣Rk(Q) + tHk,0Z0H†k,0∣∣∣]
t=0
(2.48)
= −
∑
k∈R
TrA−1k (Q)Hk,0Z0H
†
k,0 − TrR−1k (Q)Hk,0Z0H†k,0 (2.49)
= Tr
(∑
k∈R
H†k,0
(
R−1k (Q)−A−1k (Q)
)
Hk,0
)
Z0. (2.50)
As a gradient, this is written
∇−→
Q0
Ju(Q) =
∑
k∈R
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
H†k,0
(
R−1k (Q)−A−1k (Q)
)
Hk,0. (2.51)
We now commence with calculating the blocks within the regions of the pseudohessian in Fig. 2.1.
The k-th row in regions I, III, and V contains derivatives of the k-th block element of the pseudo-
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gradient with respect to Qk, Q0, and Qj , j ∈ R\{k}, respectively. We can generally solve for the
block in position (k, i) for k ∈ R and i ∈ P by first calculating the directional derivative of (2.45)
when Qi is perturbed in the direction Zi:
D (Duk(Q;Zk);Zi) = d
dt
TrH†k,k
(
Ak(Q) + tHk,iZiH
†
k,i
)−1
Hk,kZk
∣∣∣∣
t=0
(2.52)
= −TrH†k,kA−1k (Q)Hk,iZiH†k,iA−1k (Q)Hk,kZk (2.53)
= −
(−→
Zk
)ᵀRe(C∗k,i⊗Ck,i) − Im(C∗k,i⊗Ck,i)
Im
(
C∗k,i⊗Ck,i
)
Re
(
C∗k,i⊗Ck,i
) −→Zi, (2.54)
where Ck,i = H
†
k,kA
−1
k (Q)Hk,i for any i ∈ P and where (2.54) follows from use of Lemma A.2. The
2N2t -square matrix is cumbersome to write, so we abbreviate the act of splitting a complex matrix
into its real and imaginary blocks as
CRI(X) =
[
ReX − ImX
ImX ReX
]
. (2.55)
Using this notation, the i-th block entry in the k-th block row of the pseudohessian can be written
Gk,i(Q) = −CRI
((
H†k,kA
−1
k (Q)Hk,i
)∗⊗(H†k,kA−1k (Q)Hk,i)) . (2.56)
The last block on the diagonal, region II, contains the second deriviatives of the jammer’s utility
with respect to its own action. The directional derivative of (2.50) when Q0 is perturbed in the
direction Z0 is1
D (DJu(Q;Z0);Z0) = −
∑
k∈R
TrH†k,0
(
R−1k Hk,0Z0H
†
k,0R
−1
k −A−1k Hk,0Z0H†k,0A−1k
)
Hk,0Z0. (2.57)
Here every term in the summation conains two traces of the form in Lemma A.2.
D (DJu(Q;Z0);Z0) =
−
(−→
Z0
)ᵀ[∑
k∈R
CRI
((
H†k,0R
−1
k Hk,0
)∗⊗(H†k,0R−1k Hk,0))
−CRI
((
H†k,0A
−1
k Hk,0
)∗⊗(H†k,0A−1k Hk,0))]−→Z0. (2.58)
1To save space, we will occasionally write Ak = Ak(Q) and likewise for Rk = Rk(Q). In all cases, however, the
Ak and Rk matrices are functions of the joint action.
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We extract from this the (0, 0) block of the pseudohessian:
G0,0(Q) = −
∑
k∈R
CRI
((
H†k,0R
−1
k Hk,0
)∗⊗(H†k,0R−1k Hk,0))
− CRI
((
H†k,0A
−1
k Hk,0
)∗⊗(H†k,0A−1k Hk,0)) . (2.59)
In region IV the j-th block column contains derivatives of the jammer’s component of the pseu-
dogradient with respect to user j’s action. The directional derivative of (2.50) with Qj perturbed
in the direction Zj is
D (DJu(Q;Z0);Zj) =
d
dt
Tr
∑
k∈R
k 6=j
H†k,0
((
Rk + tHk,jZjH
†
k,j
)−1 − (Ak + tHk,jZjH†k,j)−1)Hk,0Z0

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
t=0
+
d
dt
Tr−H†j,0
(
Aj + tHj,jZjH
†
j,j
)−1
Hj,0Z0
∣∣∣∣
t=0
. (2.60)
After differentiating we get
D (DJu(Q;Z0);Zj) =
−
∑
k∈R
k 6=j
TrH†k,0
(
R−1k Hk,jZjH
†
k,jR
−1
k −A−1k Hk,jZjH†k,jA−1k
)
Hk,0Z0
+ TrH†j,0A
−1
j Hj,jZjH
†
j,jA
−1
j Hj,0Z0. (2.61)
Lemma A.2 turns this into
D (DJu(Q;Z0);Zj) =
(−→
Z0
)ᵀ[
CRI
((
H†j,jA
−1
j Hj,0
)ᵀ⊗(H†j,0A−1j Hj,j))
−
∑
k∈R
k 6=j
CRI
((
H†k,jR
−1
k Hk,0
)ᵀ⊗(H†k,0R−1k Hk,j))
−CRI
((
H†k,jA
−1
k Hk,0
)ᵀ⊗(H†k,0A−1k Hk,j))]−→Zj , (2.62)
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The j-th block column of region IV of the pseudohessian is then
G0,j(Q) = CRI
((
H†j,jA
−1
j Hj,0
)ᵀ⊗(H†j,0A−1j Hj,j))
−
∑
k∈R
k 6=j
CRI
((
H†k,jR
−1
k Hk,0
)ᵀ⊗(H†k,0R−1k Hk,j))− CRI((H†k,jA−1k Hk,0)ᵀ⊗(H†k,0A−1k Hk,j)) .
(2.63)
With the pseudohessian fleshed out, we can now consider the conditions under which the size
of a utility game’s set of equilibria can be characterized. There is a natural split in this analysis
between the case were users do not interfere with each other—termed zero cross-talk—and the case
in which each users sees all three flavors of interference: ambient, competitive, and malicious.
2.3.1 Zero Cross-Talk
We define a zero cross-talk channel to be one which for every k ∈ R,
Hk,j = 0 ∀j ∈ R\{k}. (2.64)
In games played on these channels, each user sees ambient noise as well as interference from the jam-
mer but is unaffected by the other users. While highlighting the differences, the proof of uniqueness
in the utility game follows Rosen’s uniqueness proof closely.
Theorem 2.5 In addition to being a zero cross-talk channel, assume the channel matrices meet the
following conditions for all k ∈ R:
rankHk,k = Nt, (2.65a)
rankHk,0 = Nt. (2.65b)
Then for any c¯ the set of equilibria of the utility game Γu(c¯) will have one of the following properties:
1. Eu(c¯) is a singleton, Qˆ, in which Qˆk  0 for at least one k ∈ R, or
2. Eu(c¯) may contain multiple equilibria, but none of those equilibria will have positive definite
user actions.
Proof Any user k ∈ R with c¯k = 0 possess a singleton strategy set—the zero matrix—and has no
effect on the utility of any other agent. If c¯0 = 0, then the result follows from the jammer-free case
in [2, Proposition 3.1]. Therefore without loss of generality we consider games with strictly positive
constraints: c¯ ∈ Rp++.
To classify the size of Eu(c¯), we first assume that there are two Nash equilibria, Q0 and Q1, and
then proceed to show that if any of the user equilibrium actions is positive definite we arrive at a
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contradiction. On the other hand, if no user action is positive definite, no contradiction occurs and
multiple equilibria may exist.
To proceed with the proof by contradiction, suppose Q0 possesses a nonempty set of users with
positive definite equilibrium strategies:
I0 = {k ∈ R : Q0k  0} 6= ∅. (2.66)
The KKT conditions at equilibrium imply the existence of nonnegative multipliers µ0, ν0, µ1, ν1 ∈
Rp+ such that for all k ∈ P
µ0k λ(Q
0
k) = 0 (2.67a)
ν0k
(
c¯k − Tr(Q0k)
)
= 0 (2.67b)
µ1k λ(Q
1
k) = 0 (2.67c)
ν1k
(
c¯k − Tr(Q1k)
)
= 0, (2.67d)
where λ(X) is the least eigenvalue of X ∈ HNt . Rosen’s uniqueness proof places Lagrange multipli-
ers on each of the concave constraint functions on the real vector actions. In the problem considered
here we place them on the minimum eigenvalue and trace functions (reflecting the positive semidef-
initeness and power constraint on the Hermitian matrix actions).
At each equilibrium the stationarity conditions can be written for all k ∈ R
∇−→
Qk
uk(Q
0) + µ0k∇−→Qk λ(Q
0
k) + ν
0
k∇−→Qk
(
c¯k − Tr(Q0k)
)
= 0 (2.68a)
∇−→
Qk
uk(Q
1) + µ1k∇−→Qk λ(Q
1
k) + ν
1
k∇−→Qk
(
c¯k − Tr(Q1k)
)
= 0 (2.68b)
and
∇−→
Q0
Ju(Q0) + µ00∇−→Q0 λ(Q
0
0) + ν
0
0∇−→Q0
(
c¯0 − Tr(Q00)
)
= 0 (2.69a)
∇−→
Q0
Ju(Q1) + µ10∇−→Q0 λ(Q
1
0) + ν
1
0∇−→Q0
(
c¯0 − Tr(Q10)
)
= 0. (2.69b)
We proceed by left-multiplying each (2.68a) and (2.69a) by the corresponding
(−→
Q1k −
−→
Q0k
)ᵀ
, left-
multiplying each (2.68b) and (2.69b) by the corresponding
(−→
Q0k −
−→
Q1k
)ᵀ
, and summing these terms
over all agents. This results in the sum
β + γ = 0 (2.70)
where2
β =
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)ᵀ
g(Q0) +
(−→
Q0 −
−→
Q1
)ᵀ
g(Q1) (2.71)
2What follows is a slight abuse of the real vectorization notation. When the real vectorization operation is written
over a joint action, we take this to mean the vertical concatenation of each of the real vectorizations of the agent
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and
γ =
∑
k∈P
(−→
Q1k −
−→
Q0k
)ᵀ[
µ0k∇−→Qk λ(Q
0
k) + ν
0
k∇−→Qk
(
c¯k − Tr(Q0k)
)]
+(−→
Q0k −
−→
Q1k
)ᵀ[
µ1k∇−→Qk λ(Q
1
k) + ν
1
k∇−→Qk
(
c¯k − Tr(Q1k)
)]
. (2.72)
Trace is linear in the space of Hermitian matrices and the Courant-Fischer Theorem [27, Theo-
rem 4.26] characterizes the minimum eigenvalue as a concave functional on that space. There-
fore (2.72) can be bounded by
γ ≥
∑
k∈P
µ0k
[
λ(Q1k)− λ(Q0k)
]
+ µ1k
[
λ(Q0k)− λ(Q1k)
]
+
ν0k
[(
c¯k − Tr(Q1k)
)− (c¯k − Tr(Q0k))]+ ν1k [(c¯k − Tr(Q0k))− (c¯k − Tr(Q1k)]) . (2.73)
By appealing to the KKT complementary slackness conditions (2.67), many zero terms drop out
and (2.73) simplifies to
γ ≥
∑
k∈P
µ0k λ(Q
1
k) + µ
1
k λ(Q
0
k) + ν
0
k
(
c¯k − Tr(Q1k)
)
+ ν1k
(
c¯k − Tr(Q0k)
)
(2.74)
≥ 0, (2.75)
where the final inequality comes from observing that all of the factors in all of the terms in (2.74)
are nonnegative.
To complete the contradiction, we endeavor to show that β > 0, which would imply that (2.70) is
impossible. Define Q(θ) = θQ1 +(1−θ)Q0 for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Using the Jacobian of the pseudogradient
and the Chain Rule, we can write
dg(Q(θ))
dθ
= G(Q(θ))
dQ(θ)
dθ
(2.76)
= G(Q(θ))
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)
. (2.77)
actions:
−→
Q =

−→
Q1
...−→
Q0
 .
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By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, this becomes
g(Q1)− g(Q0) =
∫ 1
0
G(Q(θ))
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)
dθ. (2.78)
To write this in the form of β in (2.71), multiply both sides by
(−→
Q0 −−→Q1
)ᵀ
:
(−→
Q0 −
−→
Q1
)ᵀ
g(Q1) +
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)ᵀ
g(Q0) = −
∫ 1
0
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)ᵀ
G(Q(θ))
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)
dθ. (2.79)
The integrand can be written as a real quadratic form by splitting G and adding its transpose:(−→
Q0 −
−→
Q1
)ᵀ
g(Q1) +
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)ᵀ
g(Q0) =
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)ᵀ
[G(Q(θ)) +G (ᵀQ(θ))]
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)
dθ. (2.80)
Thus it suffices to show that G¯(Q(θ)) = G(Q(θ)) +G (ᵀQ(θ)) is a negative real quadratic form over
vectors drawn from {−→Z : Z ∈∏k∈P HNt}3 for all 0 < θ < 1.
Under zero cross-talk many of the pseudohessian blocks can be significantly simplified. Princi-
pally, all blocks in region V are zero. Further, all the terms in the summation in (2.63) disappear.
This results in G0,j(Q(θ)) = −Gᵀj,0(Q(θ)) for all j ∈ R and thus all off-diagonal blocks of the sym-
metrized pseudohessian are zero. Since the symmetrized pseudohessian is block diagonal in the zero
cross-talk case, it would suffice to show that each of its diagonal blocks is negative definite with
respect to Hermitian matrices for all 0 < θ < 1.
The blocks in region I all have the form (2.56) with i = k. Since A−1k (Q) is positive definite for
all Q ∈ S, pre- and post-multiplication by the full rank Hk,k preserves its definiteness. As such,
(2.54) will be strictly negative for all Hermitian Zk.
To analyze the definiteness of the region II block, we return to (2.57) and isolate the kˆ term for
some kˆ ∈ I0:
− Tr
[
R−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0R
−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))−A−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0A
−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))
]
Z˜0 =
TrA
−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0A
−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0A
−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ))
− TrR−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0R
−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0R
−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ)), (2.81)
3While accurate, this terminolgoy is cumbersome. Henceforth we will shorten this to “negative definite with respect
to Hermitian matrices” to strike a balance between accuracy and readability.
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where we have substituted the Hermitian Z˜0 for Hk,0Z0H
†
k,0. By adding and subtracting
TrA
−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0R
−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0A
−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ)), (2.82)
(2.81) can be written
TrA
−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0
(
A−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))−R−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))
)
Z˜0A
−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ))
+ TrR
−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ))Z˜0
(
A−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))−R−1
kˆ
(Q(θ))
)
Z˜0R
−1/2
kˆ
(Q(θ)). (2.83)
By assumption, the action of user kˆ ∈ I0 is positive definite for all 0 ≤ θ < 1. Since rankHk,k = Nt
for all users, we have Akˆ(Q(θ))  Rkˆ(Q(θ)) over that same range of θ. This ordering is reversed
for their inverses: Akˆ(Q(θ)) ≺ Rkˆ(Q(θ)), so (2.83) is strictly negative. Thus there must be at least
one term in (2.57) that is negative. The other terms are at most zero (replace the strict Löwner
orderings with weak ones in the above argument), so we can conclude that
(−→
Z0
)ᵀ
G0,0(Q(θ))
−→
Z0 < 0
for all 0 ≤ θ < 1. This is not a proof of the negative definiteness of G0,0(Q(θ)). However, we
have shown that all of the diagonal blocks of the pseudohessian are negative definite with respect
to Hermitian matrices, and this is enough to show that the integrand of (2.80) is strictly negative.
In summary, if the equilibrium assumed to have a positive definite user action does exist, then
along the line connecting that equilibrium and any other possible equilibrium the integrand in (2.80)
is strictly negative. This implies that (2.70) is impossible so the conclusion must be that either no
other equilibria exist, or no equilibrium has positive definite user actions. 2
2.3.2 Nonzero Cross-Talk
We now endeavor to generalize Theorem 2.5 to instances with nonzero cross-talk between the users.
It is useful to view the pseudohessian in these games, G¯CT(Q), as a perturbation of the pseudohessian
in the zero cross-talk scenario, G¯ZCT(Q):
G¯CT(Q) = G¯ZCT(Q) + G˜(Q). (2.84)
That is, for any collection of channel matrices the pseudohessian in the utility game played on
those channels can be decomposed into two terms: one that does not depend on the inter-user
interferences and one that does.
The cross-talk channel matrices do not change regions I and II of the pseudohessian, so the
diagonal blocks of the perturbation
G˜k,k(Q) = 0 ∀k ∈ P. (2.85)
Conversely, all of the blocks in region V come from the perturbation. We use (2.56) twice (once
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with (k, j) and once with (j, k)) along with Lemma A.7 to write the (k, j)-block of the perturbation
pseudohessian for (k, j) ∈ R×R\{k} as
G˜k,j(Q) = −CRI
(
Hᵀk,k⊗H†k,k
)
CRI
(
A−ᵀk (Q)⊗A−1k (Q)
)
CRI
(
H∗k,j ⊗Hk,j
)
− CRI
(
Hᵀj,k⊗H†j,k
)
CRI
(
A−ᵀj (Q)⊗A−1j (Q)
)
CRI
(
H∗j,j ⊗Hj,j
)
(2.86)
In region III, the jammer’s column of the k-th row has the form G¯CTk,0(Q) = Gk,0(Q)+G
ᵀ
0,k(Q).
Recalling (2.56) and (2.63), we write4
G¯CTk,0(Q) = −CRI
((
H†k,kA
−1
k Hk,0
)∗⊗(H†k,kA−1k Hk,0))
+
[
CRI
((
H†k,kA
−1
k Hk,0
)ᵀ⊗(H†k,0A−1k Hk,k))]ᵀ
−
∑
j∈R
j 6=k
[
CRI
((
H†j,kR
−1
j Hj,0
)ᵀ⊗(H†j,0Rjk−1Hj,k))
− CRI
((
H†j,kA
−1
j Hj,0
)ᵀ⊗(H†j,0A−1j Hj,k))]ᵀ . (2.87)
Just as they did in the zero cross-talk case, the first two terms in (2.87) cancel (which implies
G¯ZCTk,0(Q) = 0 for all k ∈ R). The remaining summation is new in the nonzero cross-talk case and
can be written
G¯CTk,0(Q) = G˜k,0(Q) (2.88)
= −
∑
j∈R
j 6=k
CRI
(
Hᵀj,0⊗H†j,0
)
CRI
(
R−ᵀj ⊗R−1j −A−ᵀj ⊗A−1j
)
CRI
(
H∗j,k⊗Hj,k
)
. (2.89)
Finally, as the pseudohessian is real symmetric, G¯CTk,0(Q) = G¯
ᵀ
CT0,k(Q) for all k ∈ R.
In what follows, we will bound the effect of the user-user interference channels with the largest
maximum singular value of those channel matrices:
σc = max
(k,j)∈R×R
k 6=j
σ(Hk,j). (2.90)
Theorem 2.6 For any c¯ ∈ Rp+, assume the channel matrices of the utility game Γ(c¯) obey (2.65).
For any  > 0, there is a σˆc > 0 such that if σc < σˆc, there can be at most one equilibrium Q with
the property that λ(Qk) >  for some k ∈ R.
Proof Assume that there are two Nash equilibria, Q0 and Q1, that have nonempty sets of users
with minimum eigenvalues greater than . Again define Q(θ) = θQ1 + (1− θ)Q0 for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
4For notational clarity, the dependence of Ak(·) and Rk(·) on the joint action Q ∈ U(c¯) has been suppressed.
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Based on the argument in Theorem 2.5, G¯ZCT(Q(θ)) must be negative definite with respect to
Hermitian matrices for all 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. That is, for all Z ∈∏k∈P HNt ,(−→
Z
)ᵀ
G¯ZCT(Q(θ))
−→
Z < 0. (2.91)
To extend this statement to the nonzero cross-talk pseudohessian requires(−→
Z
)ᵀ
G¯CT(Q(θ))
−→
Z =
(−→
Z
)ᵀ
G¯ZCT(Q(θ))
−→
Z +
(−→
Z
)ᵀ
G˜(Q(θ))
−→
Z (2.92)
be strictly negative for θ throughout (0, 1), thereby leading to a contradiction. To this end, if
we could bound the maximum singular value of G˜(Q(θ)), then we could bound
(−→
Z
)ᵀ
G˜(Q(θ))
−→
Z ,
provided Z is drawn from a compact set.
In his work on block matrices, Feingold provides [16, Theorem 2] which bounds the maximum
singular value of a matrix by the sum of the maximum singular values of the off-diagonal blocks. In
the context of the proof at hand where all of the diagonal blocks of the perturbation pseudohessian
are zero, we have
σ(G˜(Q(θ))) ≤ max
k∈P
∑
j∈P\{k}
σ(G˜k,j(Q(θ))). (2.93)
For row k ∈ R and column j ∈ R\{k}, start with (2.86) and apply the triangle inequality, Corol-
lary A.9, and Lemma A.6 to get
σ(G˜k,j(Q(θ))) ≤ σ
(
Hᵀk,k⊗H†k,k
)
σ
(
A−ᵀk (Q(θ))⊗A−1k (Q(θ))
)
σ
(
H∗k,j ⊗Hk,j
)
+ σ
(
Hᵀj,k⊗H†j,k
)
σ
(
A−ᵀj (Q(θ))⊗A−1j (Q(θ))
)
σ
(
H∗j,j ⊗Hj,j
)
. (2.94)
The maximum singular value of a Kronecker product is the product of the maximum singular values
of its factors (see, for example, Proposition A.5), so this bound is equivalent to
σ(G˜k,j(Q(θ))) ≤ σ2 (Hk,k)λ2
(
A−1k (Q(θ))
)
σ2 (Hk,j) + σ
2 (Hj,k)λ
2
(
A−1j (Q(θ))
)
σ2 (Hj,j) (2.95)
=
σ2 (Hk,k)σ
2 (Hk,j)
λ2 (Ak(Q(θ)))
+
σ2 (Hj,j)σ
2 (Hj,k)
λ2 (Aj(Q(θ)))
(2.96)
≤ σ2 (Hk,k)σ2 (Hk,j) + σ2 (Hj,j)σ2 (Hj,k) , (2.97)
where the last line follows by observing that for all users and all joint actions, λ(Ak(Q)) ≥ 1.
The jammer’s block in row k ∈ R is (2.89). We use the same procedure to bound its maximum
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singular value:
σ(G˜k,0(Q(θ))) ≤
∑
j∈R
j 6=k
σ2 (Hj,0)σ
(
R−ᵀj (Q(θ))⊗R−1j (Q(θ))−A−ᵀj (Q(θ))⊗A−1j (Q(θ))
)
σ2 (Hj,k) .
(2.98)
Note that R−ᵀj (Q)⊗R−1j (Q) and A−ᵀj (Q)⊗A−1j (Q) are Hermitian positive definite for all Q ∈
U(c¯) and all j ∈ R. Lemma A.10 bounds the maximum singular value of their difference by
max{λ(R−ᵀj (Q)⊗R−1j (Q)), λ(A−ᵀj (Q)⊗A−1j (Q))}. Thus the size of the block G˜k,0(Q(θ)) can be
bounded by
σ(G˜k,0(Q(θ))) ≤
∑
j∈R
j 6=k
σ2 (Hj,0)σ
2 (Hj,k) max
{
λ
2
(R−1j (Q(θ))), λ
2
(A−1j (Q(θ)))
}
(2.99)
=
∑
j∈R
j 6=k
σ2 (Hj,0)σ
2 (Hj,k)
λ2(Rj(Q(θ)))
(2.100)
≤
∑
j∈R
j 6=k
σ2 (Hj,0)σ
2 (Hj,k) , (2.101)
where the last line follows because λ(Rj(Q)) ≥ 1 for all users.
The inequalities (2.97) and (2.101) give bounds on the off-diagonal blocks of the perturbation
pseudohessian that are independent of the joint actions Q0 and Q1. If, as supposed, Q0 and Q1
both have at least one user with minimum eigenvalue greater than , then we must have
max
0≤θ≤1
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)ᵀ
G¯ZCT(Q(θ))
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)
< 0. (2.102)
The difference
∥∥∥−→Q1 −−→Q0∥∥∥ is bounded because each joint action is drawn from a compact strategy
set; this bound can be taken as independent of Q0 and Q1. Thus the quantity(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)ᵀ
G˜(Q(θ))
(−→
Q1 −
−→
Q0
)
(2.103)
can be restricted in magnitude without knowledge of Q0 and Q1 by appropriate choice of σˆc. This
guarantees G¯CT(Q(θ)) remains negative definite with respect to Hermitian matrices for all 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,
which produces a contradiction on the assumption that two Nash equilibria exist with user actions
more than  away from singularity. Therefore at most one such Nash equilibrium can exist. 2
The results of Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 2.6 are consistent with results in the literature. In
[23], the authors observe that for their generalized iterative water-filling algorithm to converge in a
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jammed multi-user MIMO network (limited to orthogonal tones), the users should not concentrate
their power on a few of their tones. The following examples demonstrate the value of each of the
assumptions in Theorem 2.5.
Example 2.2 Consider a zero cross-talk system with two users each with two antennae and all
agents restricted to unit power. Let the channel matrices be
H1,1 =
[
0.9 0
0 0.1
]
, H2,2 =
[
0.1 0
0 0.9
]
, (2.104)
H1,0 =
[
0 0
1 0
]
, H2,0 =
[
0 1
0 0
]
. (2.105)
Clearly, these jammer channel matrices violate assumption (2.65b). Regardless of the jammer action,
the users’ optimal actions are to put all of their power on their stronger subchannel:
Qˆ1 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, Qˆ2 =
[
0 0
0 1
]
. (2.106)
However, given these user actions, the jammer cannot affect the capacity of the network: it can
only jam the subchannels that each user is not using. Thus any feasible action is an equilibrium
action for the jammer.
We now make a few comments about the results set out in Theorem 2.5. A sufficient condition
to guarantee that at least one user has a positive definite equilibrium strategy is that the power
budget for at least one user must be sufficiently large:
c¯i ≥ cˆ, (2.107)
for at least one i ∈ R. The sufficiency can be seen by appealing to the water-filling optimization
process. Regardless of other users’ cross-talk, jammer interference, or ambient noise, a user’s optimal
power allocation will be distributred over all subchannels if the volume of water that user “pours”
(which is proportional to their power budget) is sufficiently large. The sufficient lower bound cˆ will
depend on the various channel gain matrices in the game as well as the power budgets of the other
agents. Thus one can guarantee a unique equilibrium in a utility game with conditions only on the
primitives of that game (channel gain matrices and agent power budgets).
If we increase the power budget to one of the users in Example 2.2, then a uniqueness of the
equilibrium can be established.
Example 2.3 Take the game from Example 2.2 and change c¯1 from 1 to 200. This is roughly the
smallest power level that allows user 1’s water level to spill onto its second subchannel (see Fig.
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of multi-user MIMO water-filling from user k’s perspective. The column heights are the
reciprocals of the diagonal elements of the Dk(Q) matrix defined in (2.109). The “water level,” µk is the unique scalar
that causes the volume of water above the columns and below the dashed line to be c¯k (assuming columns of unit
width).
2.2). Now the unique equilibrium is
Qˆ1 =
[
199.3446 0
0 0.6554
]
, Qˆ2 =
[
0 0
0 1
]
, Qˆ0 =
[
0.9996 0
0 0.0004
]
. (2.108)
An additional factor to consider when evaluating a cost game for uniqueness is the size of the
jammer’s channel gain matrices, {Hk,0}, k ∈ R. One would expect that as the norms of these
matrices diminish, the jammer’s ability to achieve meaninful interference would similarly decay. In
the limit, we should see the game approach the jammer-free case. The norms of the jammer channel
gain matrices need not necessarily be pushed to zero, because diminishing these matrices will have
a similar effect as increasing users’ power budgets.
The water-filling best response of user k ∈ R to a joint action Q can best been seen in terms of
the eigendecomposition of the effective channel gain:
H†k,kR
−1
k (Q)Hk,k = Uk(Q)Dk(Q)U
†
k(Q), (2.109)
where Dk(Q) is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. With this notation, user k’s best response is the
water-filling operation
BRk(Q−k) = Uk(Q)
(
µkI −D−1k (Q)
)+
U †k(Q), (2.110)
which is illustrated in Fig. 2.2.
If Hk,0 shrinks in norm, this has the effect of inflating the eigenvalues of H
†
k,kR
−1
k Hk,k, which in
turn diminishes the heights of the columns in Fig. 2.2. User k’s power budget is now more likely to
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cover with positive depth the columns in its vessel.
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CHAPTER 3
DYNAMICS AND CONVERGENCE
The salient feature of modeling the jammed interference channel as a game is that the optimiza-
tion decisions are distributed to the agents themselves; no centralized authority is present. Along
these lines, in this chapter we present methods by which the agents may iteratively update their
actions so that they reach an equilibrium state. Features of merit of these dynamic processes in-
clude the extent of the distribution of optimization, the tendency of the process to converge to an
equilibrium state, and the time required to reach that equilibrium state.
One dynamic process is said to be more distributed than another if it requires fewer assumptions
of common knowledge amongst the agents. We present no proofs of convergence—these are planned
for future work—but we do include extensive simulation results that support the notion that these
algorithms converge from all feasible initial joint actions and a wide variety of channel matrices.
Lastly, we compare the speed of each algorithm by averaging run times of the simulations for a
number of antenna array sizes and user population sizes.
Best-response is a widely employable method that can be applied to both the utility and cost
games (albeit with some restrictions on the cost game). Alternatively, gradient-play is proposed
as a computationally friendly process on the compact convex strategy sets of the utility game.
Finally, a distributed stream control process designed to improve the overall network performance
is considered in the presence of the jammer.
All of the algorithms in this chapter are intentionally presented as non-terminating. The in-
tention is that these dynamic processes are run indefinitely but that agent actions converge to a
steady state eventually. Of course, when these algorithms were simulated—using software presented
in Appendix B—termination conditions were introduced to detect when steady state was reached.
3.1 Best-Response Dynamics
The update process known as best-response dynamics is well suited to find the equilbrium in both
utility and cost games. For user k ∈ R, the best-response correspondence in Γu(c¯) is
BRuk(Q−k) = arg max
Qk∈Uk(c¯k)
uk(Qk, Q−k). (3.1)
Likewise, in Γc(u¯), the best-response correspondence for user k ∈ R is
BRck(Q−k) = arg min
Qk∈Ck(u¯k,Q−k)
ck(Qk). (3.2)
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Analogously, the best-response correspondences for the jammer are
BRu0(Q−0) = arg max
Q0∈U0(c¯0)
Ju(Q0, Q−0) (3.3)
BRc0(Q−0) = arg min
Q0∈C0(u¯0)
Jc(Q0, Q−0). (3.4)
Recall that Jc(Q) = −Ju(Q) and that in both utility and cost games the jammer endeavors to
minimize the sum of the mutual information of all users.
The joint best-response correspondence for the utility and cost games are BRu(·) and BRc(·),
respectively, as defined in (1.7). Although not explicit in this notation, each best-response corre-
spondence depends on its game’s constraint vector: c¯ and u¯, respectively.
An implementation of the best-response process for Γu(c¯) is presented in Algorithm 1, below.
Each agent’s update is tempered by the parameter α(t), which represents the agents’ willingness to
optimize as time goes on. It’s complement, 1 − α(t), can be thought of as the inertia experienced
by each agent when it is tasked with updating. These parameters are chosen such that
0 < α(t) < 1, ∀t, (3.5a)
lim
t→∞α(t) = 0, (3.5b)
∞∑
t=1
α(t) =∞, (3.5c)
and serve to smooth out the trajectories.
Algorithm 1 Best-response dynamics for Γu(c¯)
for k = {0, . . . , r} do
Initialize Qk(0) ∈ Uk(c¯k)
end for
t = 1
while t ≥ 1 do
for k = {0, . . . , r} do
Qk(t+ 1) ∈ (1− α(t))Qk(t) + α(t) BRuk(Q−k(t))
end for
t = t+ 1
end while
For user k ∈ R, the best-response correspondence in principle requires knowledge of Q−k and
Hk,j for all j ∈ P. However, in practice it is sufficient for user k to measure the total interference
it encounters, Rk(Q), as none of the other agents’ individual actions or channel matrices appear
separately when user k optimizes its utility.
Figure 3.1 shows the mutual information trajectories for best-response dynamics in a sample
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Figure 3.1: Best-response trajectories for Γu(c¯) where c¯k = 10 for all k ∈ P = {0, 1, . . . , 8} and random channel
matrices in C4×4. All user channel matrices were scaled such that ‖Hk,k‖ = 20 dB for all k ∈ R, and all interference
channel matrices were scaled such that ‖Hj,k‖ = 10 dB for all j 6= k ∈ R×P. All agents, including the jammer (not
shown), converged to their equilibrium strategy within 20 iterations.
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utility game.
Whereas the utility game best-response dynamics appear to converge for all power budgets, the
cost minimization game does not share this good fortune. For arbitrary target utility levels, the
existence of an equilibrium cannot be guaranteed even for small games.
Example 3.1 Consider the cost game with u¯ = (−1, 9, 6, 3) and channel matrices as follows:
H1,1 = H2,2 = H3,3 =
[
2 0
0 2
]
H1,2 = H1,3 = H2,3 =
1
2
[
1 j
0 1
]
H2,1 = H3,1 = H3,2 =
1
2
[
1 0
j 1
]
H1,0 = H2,0 = H3,0 =
[
2 j
1− j 1
]
.
The users’ trajectories under a best-response process are shown in Fig. 3.2. The top plot conveys the
perils of unbounded strategy sets: the users iteratively increase their transmission power without
bound in response to increased powers of the other agents. The bottom plot shows the trend that
no finite power levels are enough for the users to achieve their utility goals. Even—as it appears for
user 3 with constraint u¯3 = 3 shown in red in this example—when the utility levels asymptotically
approach their constraint levels, the power grows without bound.
The jammer is present in this example, but the phenomenon of ever-increasing power levels was
also observed in cost games without a jammer in [4].
By modifying the objectives of the users to include penalties for missing their target utilities,
equilibrium existence can be recovered. For any target utility levels u¯ ∈ R−×Rr+ and any vector of
weights w ∈ Rr+, we define the weighted cost minimization game Γw(u¯) as one in which each user
k ∈ R aims to optimize
min
Qk∈Sk
ck(Qk) + wk (u¯k − uk(Qk, Q−k))+ . (3.6)
The analogous best-response correspondence1 for this game is
BRwk (Q−k) = arg min
Qk∈Sk
ck(Qk) + wk (u¯k − uk(Qk, Q−k))+ . (3.7)
Note that in Γw(u¯) the jammer’s objective and constraint is identical to that in Γc(u¯) because the
jammer’s feasible strategy set is already decoupled. Indeed, the jammer is still power constrained
and interested only in minimizing the total system capacity. That is, BRw0 (·) = BRc0(·).
1Again, the dependence of BRwk on u¯, while important, is suppressed to minimize notational clutter.
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Figure 3.2: Non-convergent cost game under best-response dynamics. The cost and utility trajectories are plotted for
the three users in the system described in Example 3.1. Dashed lines indicate each user’s mandated utility minimum
(which none achieved).
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The strategy sets of the users in the weighted best-response game are unbounded, but neverthe-
less Theorem 3.1, below, provides for the existence of a joint strategy Qˆ ∈ S such that
BRw(Qˆ) = Qˆ, (3.8)
where BRw(·) is the joint best-response correspondence as in (1.7), for any reasonable vectors of
constraints and weights.
Theorem 3.1 For any u¯ ∈ R− × Rr+ and any w ∈ Rr+, Γw(u¯) possesses a Nash equilibrium.
Proof For any user k ∈ R, playing the zero matrix guarantees a cost of wku¯k. Thus for every
k ∈ R and any Q−k ∈ S−k,
Q′k ∈ BRwk (Q−k) =⇒ ck(Q′k) ≤ wku¯k. (3.9)
For the jammer, the Weierstrass Theorem guarantees that for all Q−0 ∈ S−0,
BRw0 (Q−0) = arg min
Q0∈C0(u¯0)
∑
k∈R
uk(Q0, Q−0) (3.10)
will achieve its minimum on the compact convex set C0(u¯0).
Taken together these results imply that the joint best response maps S to S¯w, where
S¯w = C0(u¯0)× S¯w1 × · · · × S¯wr , (3.11)
S¯wk = cc ({Qk ∈ Sk : ck(Qk) ≤ wku¯k}) , (3.12)
and cc(·) denotes the closure of the convex hull.
The restriction of Γw(u¯) to be played on S¯w is a concave game played on compact, convex
strategy sets and thus possesses a Nash equilibrium (Proposition 1.1). Since the image of S under
BRw(·) is contained in S¯w, any equilibrium of this restricted game must also be an equilibrium of
the unrestricted game, Γw(u¯). 2
Theorem 3.1 appears for general cost-minimizers in [4, Proposition 7]. However, the presence of
a utility-minimizing jammer is novel in this context.
Even games with no generalized Nash equilibria, such as the one in Example 3.1, can exhibit
convergent best-response behavior when considered as a weighted cost game. Once the cost game
in Example 3.1 is augmented with weight vector w = (20, 20, 20), the best-response trajectories of
this game appear in Fig. 3.3.
For a constraint vector u¯ and weight vector w, the set of Nash equilibria of the weighted cost
game Γw(u¯) is
Ew(u¯) =
{
Qˆ ∈ S : BRw(Qˆ) = Qˆ
}
. (3.13)
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Figure 3.3: Convergent weighted cost game under best-response dynamics. Under the same utility requirements
as Example 3.1, users now minimize a weighted sum of their cost and utility. For the uniform weight vector w =
(20, 20, 20), all agents converged to equilibrium strategies within five iterations. As expected, however, not all of the
users are transmitting at their mandated minimum rate (shown as dashed lines) at equilibrium.
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The intent of the weighted cost game is to soften the possibly unobtainable constraint on each
user. However, if an equilibrium can be reached in the weighted cost game that satisfies the utility
constraints, that strategy is also an equilibrium of the original unweighted cost game.
Theorem 3.2 For any u¯ ∈ R− ×Rr+ and any w ∈ Rr+, if an equilibrium strategy of Γw(u¯) satisfies
all the minimum utility requirements, it is also an equilibrium of Γc(u¯):{
Qˆ ∈ Ew(u¯) : uk(Qˆ) ≥ u¯k∀k ∈ R
}
⊆ Ec(u¯) (3.14)
Proof First note that if Qˆ ∈ Ew(u¯), then Jc(Qˆ) ≤ Jc(Q0, Qˆ−0) for all Q0 ∈ C0(u¯0), which is the
same requirement on Qˆ0 to be a Nash equilibrium strategy for the jammer in Γc(u¯).
The proof for the users follows the method of [4, Proposition 8]. Let Qˆ be an equilibrium strategy
in Γw(u¯) as in the left-hand side of (3.14). Then for all k ∈ R and all Qk ∈ Sk,
ck(Qˆk) = ck(Qˆk) + wk
(
u¯k − uk(Qˆ)
)+
(3.15)
≤ ck(Qk) + wk
(
u¯k − uk(Qk, Qˆ−k)
)+
, (3.16)
where (3.15) follows from the supposition u¯k − uk(Qˆ) ≤ 0, and (3.16) follows by virtue of Qˆ being
a Nash equilibrium of the weighted cost game.
If there exists some Q′k ∈ Ck(u¯k, Qˆ−k), then substituting into (3.16) implies ck(Qˆk) ≤ ck(Q′k).
However, Qˆk meets this requirement for all k ∈ R, so Qˆ must be an equilibrium of the unweighted
cost game Γc(u¯). 2
As a final connection between the sets of equilibria for the cost and weighted cost games, Propo-
sition 9 in [4] can be extended to be valid in the presence of a jammer. Recall that for real vectors
x and y, we use x > y to mean every element of x is larger than the corresponding element of y.
Theorem 3.3 For any u¯ ∈ R− × Rr+ and any bounded set B ⊂ S, there is some w¯ ∈ Rr+ such that
for all w > w¯, Ec(u¯) ∩ B = Ew(u¯) ∩ B.
Proof The proof approach is to show that Proposition 9 from [4] applies. The requirements on a
jammer’s equilibrium action are identical between the cost and weighted cost games.
In order to apply Proposition 9 from [4], it is sufficient to show that for all k ∈ R and all
Q−k ∈ S−k, ck(·) and uk(·, Q−k) are differentiable everywhere in Sk and that the gradients ∇−→Qkck
and ∇−→
Qk
uk are continuous in S (per [4, Remark 3]).
The requirements on ck(·) are certainly satisfied due to its linearity in Qk and invariance to Q−k.
Regarding the differentiability of uk(·, Q−k) on all of Sk, we first endeavor to show that uk(·, Q−k)
is defined on an open set containing Sk. Consider a point outside but arbitrarily close to Sk:
Q′k = Qk + B, (3.17)
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where Qk ∈ Sk, B ∈ HNt , and  > 0 is a small constant. Certainly if Q′k ∈ Sk, then uk(Q′k, Q−k) is
well-defined. The interesting case is when Q′k lies just outside Sk; in this instance user k’s utility
function can be evaluated as2
uk(Q
′
k, Q−k) = log
∣∣∣I +R−1/2k Hk,k (Qk + B)H†k,kR−1/2k ∣∣∣ (3.18)
= log
∣∣I ′ + B′∣∣ , (3.19)
where I ′ = I + R−1/2k Hk,kQkH
†
k,kR
−1/2
k  I and B′ = R−1/2k Hk,kBH†k,kR−1/2k . By judicious use of
matrix differentiation (as in [50]), (3.19) can be written
uk(Q
′
k, Q−k) = log
(
|I ′|
[
1 + Tr
(
I ′−1B′
)
+O(2)
])
, (3.20)
which is well-defined for sufficiently small  > 0. Thus uk(·, Q−k) is differentiable on an open set
containing Sk with differential (2.45) and gradient (2.46). The gradient ∇−→Qkuk(·) is continuous on
S because Ak(Q)  I is bounded strictly away from singularity for all k ∈ R and all Q ∈ S. 2
With the existence of equilibria in arbitrarily weighted cost games established, we now propose
a version of best-response dynamics for these games in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Best-Response Dynamics for Γw(u¯)
Initialize Q0(0) ∈ C0(u¯0)
for k = {1, . . . , r} do
Initialize Qk(0) ∈ S¯wk
end for
t = 1
while t ≥ 1 do
for k = {0, . . . , r} do
Qk(t+ 1) ∈ (1− α(t))Qk(t) + α(t) BRwk (Q−k(t))
end for
t = t+ 1
end while
Although conditions that guarantee covergence of the weighted cost game have not been found,
simulations suggest that these conditions are not uncommon. We now consider the tradeoffs involved
with choosing penalty weights. On one hand, the larger any user’s weight is, the more incentive
that user has to truly meet its utility requirement. On the other hand, there may be situations
in which a user’s utility requirement is just unrealistic, and an exorbitant penalty weight will only
drive its cost through the roof without producing the desired outcome.
To examine this issue, Fig. 3.4 shows an average performance analysis for random weighted
cost games. In particular, it can be seen that while increasing the penalty weights on the users
2Here the dependence of Rk on Q has been suppressed for notational simplicity.
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Figure 3.4: Average performance of BRw plotted against weight size. For each of over 270 trials, random channel
matrices were generated for a three-user-plus-jammer system with Nt = Nr = 2. For each trial, best-response
dynamics were simulated at various uniform weight vectors w = w¯1.
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does indeed drive them closer to their mandated utility levels, it has the side effect of significantly
extending the number of iterations required to converge to equilibrium. Furthermore, this increase
in penalty weighting has the largest effect on users with relatively low minimum utility requirements.
The users with relatively large utility requirements see the smallest gains while still paying the price
for longer convergence times.
3.2 Gradient-Play Dynamics
Similar to gradient-ascent optimization algorithms, the update process known as gradient-play dy-
namics has each agent update its action in the local direction of greatest gain given all other agents’
actions.
As with any gradient method, it is critical to keep the trajectory within the set of feasible
strategies. To this end, the following quantities are used in the discrete time gradient-play dynamics
described in Algorithm 3, below:
• γ¯ is the step size in the direction of steepest gradient ascent.
• ΠA[x] is the projection of the vector x ∈ B onto the convex set A ⊆ B.
Just as in best-response dynamics, the presence of inertia parameters serves to temper each agent’s
optimal update and smoothes out the trajectories.
Algorithm 3 Gradient-play dynamics for Γu(c¯)
for k = {0, 1, . . . , r} do
Initialize Qk(0) ∈ Uk(c¯k)
end for
t = 1
while t ≥ 1 do
for k = {1, . . . , r} do
Qk(t+ 1) = (1− α(t))Qk(t) + α(t)ΠUk(c¯k) [Qk(t) + γ¯∇Qkuk(Q(t))]
end for
Q0(t+ 1) = (1− α(t))Q0(t) + α(t)ΠU0(c¯0) [Q0(t) + γ¯∇Q0Ju(Q(t))]
t = t+ 1
end while
The information requirements for the gradient-play algorithm are identical to those for best-
response. At each time step user k ∈ R must measure or otherwise learn the composite interference
it is experiencing: Rk(Q(t)).
Guarantees of convergence of the gradient-play algorithm in the cost game have not yet been
proven. However, Monte Carlo simulation suggests that gradient-play is a time-efficient method of
achieving a Nash equilibrium in the cost game.
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Figure 3.5: Monte Carlo gradient-play.
In support of this conclusion simulations were run that varied the number of antennae (Nr = Nt)
from 2 to 10 with 1000 trials at each level. In each trial, the channel matrices for 10 users and a
jammer were randomly generated and then scaled so that ‖Hk,k‖ = 10 and ‖Hj,k‖ = 1 for all
j 6= k ∈ P; additionally, the power budget for each agent was randomly generated between 1 and
100. In all trials, the willingness to optimize parameter evolved as α(t) = 1t , and the step size was
set to γ¯ = 0.005 for all agents. The gradient-play algorithm was implemented in the Matlab R2016a
language (see Appendix B.4) on a 2 GHz Intel Core i5 processor. The average time to convergence
for each MIMO antenna array size is shown in Fig. 3.5.
The performance of the gradient-play method is quite impressive. The derivatives calculated at
each step are easily implementable matrix equations given in (2.46) for user k ∈ R and (2.51) for
the jammer. Additionally, each projection operation involves an V DV † spectral decomposition and
a single-variable monotonic function root search. That is, the projection of X ∈ HNt onto Uk(c¯k),
denoted ΠUk(c¯k) [X], can be obtained in this way:
• Decompose X = V diag(λ1, . . . , λNt)V † for unitary V .
• Find µ ∈ R such that ∑Nti=1(λi +µ)+ = c¯k.
• Set the new eigenvalues as ρi = (λi +µ)+, i = 1, . . . , Nt.
• Recompose ΠUk(c¯k) [X] = V diag(ρ1, . . . , ρNt)V
†.
Figure 3.6 shows user mutual information trajectories for a large sample system under gradient-
play dynamics.
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Figure 3.6: Sample trajectories for users’ mutual information under the gradient-play process. In this sample, 10 users
and one jammer each have Nt = Nr = 10 antennae. Power limits for each agent were chosen uniformly randomly
in [1, 100]. Channel matrices were also chosen randomly. Once chosen, the channel matrices were scaled so that
‖Hk,k‖ = 10 and ‖Hj,k‖ = 1 for all j 6= k ∈ P. The willingness to optimize parameter evolved according to
α(t) =

t−0.3, 1 ≤ t ≤ 1000
t−0.5, 1000 < t ≤ 2000
t−0.7, 2000 < t ≤ 3000
t−0.9, t > 3000
The gradient step size was γ¯ = 0.005.
Since both best-response and gradient-play dynamics have identical distributed information
requirements and simulations suggest both converge to the unique Nash equilibrium in the utility
game when it exists, we can compare these processes on execution time. The question is: for a given
utility game with a unique equilibrium, which process provides faster convergence?
We offer an empirical statistical answer to this question with the data summarized in Fig. 3.7.
The two independent variables are the MIMO array size (in each case constraining Nt = Nr) and
the number of users in the game (in each case including an additional jamming agent). The first
conclusion to draw from this data is that the gradient-play process tends to be around an order of
magnitude faster than the best-response process. This is not surprising due to the relatively simple
manipulations in Algorithm 3 as opposed to the nonconvex optimization required at each time step
for each agent in Algorithm 1.
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Figure 3.7: Computer simulation computation time comparison between gradient-play and best-response dynamics.
Columns are first grouped by number of users, r, and then sorted by the antenna array size with Nt = Nr in all cases.
Each column condenses approximately 400 trials into a box-and-whisker plot. For each trial, the same randomly
generated zero cross-talk utility game was solved independently by each algorithm.
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3.3 Optimization via Stream Control
The equilibrium reached in the utility game may not truly maximize the network’s capacity in
the presence of a jammer. The equilibrium strategies of all agents are merely guaranteed to be
“unilaterally optimal.” That is, a global planner may be able to coordinate the users’ strategies to
achieve higher total mutual information [14, 43]. However doing so would negate the distributed
robustness inherent in the self-interested decision makers model (i.e. a game ).
However, in [2], the authors demonstrate that a “pre-game” in which users adapt [54] the number
of MIMO subchannels they employ [12,13] can be effective in raising the total network performance.
This pre-game negotiation is against the jammer’s interests, but we can model the jammer as a
somewhat unwilling participant.
Theorem 3.4 The decentralized stream control described in [2] (i.e. spatial adaptive play) enjoys
the same convergence results when a jammer is introduced.
Proof The jammer enters the stream negotiation game as player 0, but its strategy set in this
game—the number of streams it selects to employ—is the singleton Nt. This is equivalent to saying
that the jammer will always transmit (in a unilaterally optimal way) on all of its possible streams
regardless of what the other players choose.
The jammer never changes its action, so its actions in the stream control game converge imme-
diately. As in the jammer-free case, the users observe interference from the various other agents
and continue to negotiate and converge in the presence of the jammer’s interference. 2
The assumption that the jammer is strictly self-interested is in keeping with the model used
throughout this dissertation. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to model the jammer as a
willing participant in any kind of coordination routine due to the adversarial nature of the user versus
jammer relationship. One can of course imagine situations in which the jammer might intentionally
select a suboptimal strategy (perhaps by reducing its streams) with the aim to induce the stream
control negotiations to settle on a globally suboptimal stream reduction strategy. However, this is
not in keeping with the model employed throughout this dissertation, and any investigation into
such meta-strategies will have to wait for future work.
To demonstrate the usefulness of the stream control approach, Fig. 3.8 shows average gains in
network capacity over the typical full-stream approach. With the jammer present in both scenarios,
the distributed steam control method consistently increased the system’s performance. Furthermore,
the spatial adaptive play algorithm for the stream control pre-game succeeded in locating the optimal
reduction in streams for all users in the vast majority of trials.
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Figure 3.8: On average, stream control via negotiation performs very well relative to brute-force optimization. The
results here are averaged over 250 trials with r = 4, Nt = Nr = 2, and |c¯k| identical for all k ∈ P. In each trial,
‖Hk,k‖ was normalized to 1 for all users, and the interference gain matrices were scaled so that ‖Hj,k‖ = η¯.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
This dissertation examines the question “What can be done when a jammer is present in a
MIMO Gaussian interference channel?” from a game theoretic perspective. After setting up the
preliminary game and information theoretic scaffolding, we modeled two paradigms under which
users of the channel might operate. In utility games, users strive to maximize the information
transmitted across their link in the network subject to a power constraint. In cost games, users
have the dual objective to minimize their power subject to an information rate minimum. In both
cases, the jammer appears as a minimizer of total information in the network subject to a power
constraint.
The salient features of game theoretic analysis are the supposition of self-interest by all agents
and the absence of a centralized authority. Both of these properties are vital when modeling mali-
cious out-of-network attackers. The absence of centralized authority does not imply unpredictability.
Via minor assumptions on rationality, we have described several methods by which self-interested
agents might converge upon a steady state in which no one has incentive to deviate.
Implicit in all of these processes is that if any agent in the system “goes rogue” and deviates
from its prescribed update, there is no special clause needed in the algorithms; the other agents use
their self-interest to adapt optimally.
4.1 Summary of Novel Results
This dissertation sits at the confluence of game theoretic treatments of the MU-MIMO system with
Hermitian action sets and MIMO jammers with orthogonal tones. The novel results herein include
showing that Nash equilibria exist in all utility games and some cost games. In those cost games
where an equilibrium does not exist, we can shift strategy constraints into objectives via an exact
penalty approach. The resulting game is then guaranteed to possess an equilibrium.
The relevance of a Nash equilibrium in the systems under consideration should not be underes-
timated. If the agents—including the jammer—measure performance and cost as we have modeled,
then at an equilibrium, no one can do better by unilaterally changing their strategy. That is to
say, for an equilibrium strategy Qˆ for either the cost or utility game, we can guarantee at least
log2 e
∑
k∈R uk(Qˆ) bps/Hz of capacity in the network with costs no greater than Tr Qˆk for each
k ∈ R.
We also demonstrate that under certain constraints on the network structure, the set of equilibria
in the utility game can be further characterized. In the absence of user-user interference, there may
be multiple equilibria; but if any equilibrium has a nonsingular user action, then it is the unique
equilibrium of the game. When cross-talk is allowed in the network, the uniqueness result weakens.
Similar results exist in the literature [2, 4], but we have shown to what extent the presence of a
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jammer disrupts previous findings.
In all games that meet the network requirements for uniqueness, simulations suggest that equi-
librium can be reached in the limit via a best-response process. Additionally, the closed, convex
strategy sets in the utility game admit gradient-play as a viable equilibrium-reaching method.
Finally, the presence of a jammer does not disrupt the stream-control meta-game from [2]. Users
can negotiate stream reduction while under the influence of jamming interference as a practical
method to boost total network performance.
4.2 Future Work
Extending this work is possible in a number of areas. Some involve modification of the game
structure and others would result from changes to the information and communication structures.
The immediate next step is to establish conditions under which the various dynamic update
processes are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. Convergence results in the literature assume
that the underlying game possesses a unique equilibrium. This uniqueness is achieved by enforcing
small interference gains. The question of convergence in the absence of absolute uniqueness remains
open. It is unclear whether trajectories might oscillate between multiple equilibria or if perhaps the
feasible regions could be carved up into joint basins of attraction for each equilibrium.
Fundamental to the analysis in this dissertation was the assumption that utility and cost games
are separate—but related—entities. However, there is nothing preventing, in theory, multiple users
wishing to maximize utility transmitting over the same channel in which other users wish to minimize
their power. It would be interesting to investigate what duality relationship this hybrid game would
have.
From the outset, we have assumed that the virtues of decentralized control outweigh the draw-
backs. While recent work in similar networks without jammers suggest that little is lost by shifting
power control to the users [5], there are still more questions to be answered. For example, how does
the price of anarchy—a measure of the worst-case system performance at equilibrium relative to
best-case centralized optimization [40]—change in the presence of jammers? It is possible that de-
centralized control is more robust to attacks than a centralized scheme. Quantifying this resiliency
is a major area of future work.
Tightly coupled with a price of anarchy analysis is the consideration of how the performance of
the system changes with the addition of users and jammers. Do the losses introduced by decentral-
ized control decrease (in a per capita sense) as the number of users increases? On the other hand, it
would be interesting to investigate whether a single, powerful jammer has a greater network effect
than several weaker ones. Recent work on deriving closed-form expressions for the price of anarchy
in games as a function of the number of players indicates this is a promising field of study [33].
In terms of the network model, we have made many implicit assumptions that have simplified the
analysis. Foremost among these is the time-invariance of the channel matrices. A major component
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of wireless network analysis is accounting for fading channels and other randomness in the network.
Extending the analysis in this dissertation to fading channels would increase its applicability.
We have also assumed that each agent k has knowledge of the interference gains Hk,j from all
other agents j ∈ P. In an ad hoc network this may be unrealistic (especially in the presence of
potentially stealthy jammers), but it may be possible to estimate the interference channels stochas-
tically as in [28] or perhaps induce the agents to learn the channel structure through repeated
interactions in the spirit of fictitious play [18] or regression [53].
Finally, the issue of synchronization seems to always be a sticking point in algorithmic game
theory. The concerns are valid, especially considering that communication over physical channels
may involve significant transmission delays. The best-response algorithms are relatively robust to
asynchronicities. That is, agents guarantee themselves a better payoff every time they update.
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APPENDIX A
MATRIX LEMMAS
Throughout the text, many of the proofs and derivations rely on ancillary properties of matrices.
Including these lemmas in the body of the text would unnecessarily interrupt flow. They are collected
here and referenced in the text when required.
The trace of the product of two Hermitian matrices is real, and thus can be written as the
product of real vectorizations.
Proposition A.1 (from [1]) Let A and B be Hermitian matrices of dimension n.
TrAB = (
−→
A )ᵀ
−→
B. (A.1)
To explicitly derive the various gradients of (2.46) and (2.51), we require the following result on
Kronecker arithmetic and the CRI(·) operator introduced in (2.55).
Lemma A.2 Let X and Y be Hermitian matrices of dimension n, and let C and D be complex
n× n matrices such that TrCXDY is real. Then
TrCXDY =
(−→
Y
)ᵀ
CRI (Dᵀ⊗C)−→X. (A.2)
Proof Start with the popular four-way trace result for complex vectorization [26, Lemma 2.14]:
TrCXDY = (vec(Y )ᵀ)ᵀ M vecX, (A.3)
where M = Dᵀ⊗C. Split all matrices into their real and imaginary parts:
TrCXDY = (vec(ReY ᵀ+  ImY )ᵀ)ᵀ (ReM +  ImM) vec (ReX +  ImX) (A.4)
= [(vec ReY )ᵀ −  (vec ImY )ᵀ ] (ReM +  ImM) [vec ReX +  vec ImX] , (A.5)
where in the last line we have utilized the Hermitian symmetry of Y . Distributing the multiplication
yields
TrCXDY = (vec ReY )ᵀ ReM vec ReX + (vec ImY )ᵀ ImM vec ReX
− (vec ReY )ᵀ ImM vec ImX + (vec ImY )ᵀ ReM vec ImX +  (∗) , (A.6)
where (∗) stands for a collection of terms that must evaluate to zero based on the assumed realness
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of the trace. The remaining terms can be factored out as
TrCXDY =
[
vec ReY
vec ImY
]ᵀ[
ReM − ImM
ImM ReM
][
vec ReX
vec ImX
]
, (A.7)
which is what is claimed in (A.2). 2
Corollary A.3 Let X and Y be Hermitian matrices of dimension n, and let C, D, C ′, and D′ be
complex n× n matrices such that TrCXDY + TrC ′XD′Y is real. Then
TrCXDY + TrC ′XD′Y =
(−→
Y
)ᵀ[
CRI (Dᵀ⊗C) + CRI
(
D′ᵀ ⊗C ′
)]−→
X. (A.8)
Lemma A.4 For any matrices A, B, C, and D for which the products AC and BD are defined,
CRI (AC ⊗BD) = CRI(A⊗B) CRI(C ⊗D). (A.9)
Proof Apply the popular Kronecker factoring property [32, Section 2.2] to each block:
CRI (AC ⊗BD) =
[
Re [(A⊗B)(C ⊗D)] − Im [(A⊗B)(C ⊗D)]
Im [(A⊗B)(C ⊗D)] Re [(A⊗B)(C ⊗D)]
]
. (A.10)
We can write the two relevant quantities
Re [(A⊗B)(C ⊗D)] = Re(A⊗B) Re(C ⊗D)− Im(A⊗B) Im(C ⊗D), (A.11a)
Im [(A⊗B)(C ⊗D)] = Re(A⊗B) Im(C ⊗D) + Im(A⊗B) Re(C ⊗D), (A.11b)
which is exactly what results from the matrix product CRI (A⊗B) CRI (C ⊗D). 2
We will also rely heavily on the following result pertaining to the spectrum of a Kronecker
product.
Proposition A.5 (Adapted from [30, Theorem 13.10]) Let X and Y be arbitrary matrices
with singular value decompositions UXΣXV
†
X and UY ΣY V
†
Y , respectively. Then
(UX ⊗UY )(ΣX ⊗ΣY )(VX ⊗VY )† (A.12)
is a singular value decomposition of X ⊗Y , up to a reordering of diagonal elements of ΣX ⊗ΣY .
In particular, Proposition A.5 dictates that all of the eigenvalues of the Kronecker product of
two Hermitian matrices X and Y must lie within [λ(X)λ(Y ), λ(X)λ(Y )] ⊂ R. Additionally, when
a matrix is expanded to its real and imaginary blocks via the CRI(·) operation, its singular values
are preserved.
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Lemma A.6 If X has the singular value decomposition X = UΣV †, then its real and imaginary
block form has the singular value decomposition
CRI(X) =
[
ReU ImU
ImU −ReU
][
Σ 0
0 Σ
][
ReV ᵀ ImV ᵀ
ImV ᵀ −ReV ᵀ
]
. (A.13)
Principally, the singular values of CRI(X) are identical to those of X.
Proof From its singular value decomposition, the real part of X can be written
ReX = Re [(ReU +  ImU) Σ (ReV ᵀ−  ImV )ᵀ] (A.14)
= Re [(ReUΣ + ReUΣ) (ReV ᵀ−  ImV )ᵀ] (A.15)
= (ReU) Σ (ReV )ᵀ + (ImU) Σ (ImV )ᵀ . (A.16)
Likewise its imaginary part is
ImX = (ImU) Σ (ReV )ᵀ− (ReU) Σ (ImV )ᵀ . (A.17)
Placing (A.16) and (A.17) into the approriate blocks of CRIX verifies that (A.13) is true. What
remains is to show that (A.13) is a valid singular value decomposition. To that end, we demonstrate
that if U is unitary then
[
ReU ImU
ImU −ReU
]
is also unitary (real orthogonal). Since U is unitary we
have
I = UU † (A.18)
= (ReU +  ImU) (ReUᵀ−  ImU )ᵀ (A.19)
= ReU ReUᵀ+ ImU ImUᵀ+  (−ReU ImUᵀ+ ImU ReU )ᵀ . (A.20)
This must mean ReU ReUᵀ+ ImU ImUᵀ = I and −ReU ImUᵀ+ ImU ReUᵀ = 0. We can now
conclude[
ReU ImU
ImU −ReU
][
ReU ImU
ImU −ReU
]†
=
[
ReU ImU
ImU −ReU
][
ReUᵀ ImUᵀ
ImUᵀ −ReUᵀ
]
(A.21)
=
[
ReU ReUᵀ+ ImU ImUᵀ ReU ImUᵀ− ImU ReUᵀ
−ReU ImUᵀ+ ImU ReUᵀ ReU ReUᵀ+ ImU ImUᵀ
]
(A.22)
=
[
I 0
0 I
]
. (A.23)
A similar procedure holds for V . 2
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Lemma A.7 For any complex matrix, X,
(CRIX )ᵀ = CRI(X†). (A.24)
Proof By definition,
CRI
(
X†
)
=
[
Re(X†) − Im(X†)
Im(X†) Re(X†)
]
(A.25)
=
[
Re(X )ᵀ Im(X )ᵀ
− Im(X )ᵀ Re(X )ᵀ
]
(A.26)
= (CRIX )ᵀ . (A.27)
2
The proof of Theorem 2.6 relies heavily on bounding maximum singular values of products of
matrices. The following results will aid in those bounds.
Lemma A.8 For all compatible matrices A and B, σ(AB) ≥ σ(A)σ(B).
Proof The Courant-Fischer Theorem gives us a variational characterization of the minimum sin-
gular value:
σ(AB) = inf
‖x‖2=1
‖ABx‖2 (A.28)
= inf
‖x‖2=1
‖UAΣAV †AUBΣBV †Bx‖2 (A.29)
where A = UAΣAV
†
A and B = UBΣBV
†
B are singular value decompositions. If VB is unitary
then ‖V †Bx‖2 = 1. For any compatible vector y we have ‖ΣBy‖2 ≥ ‖σ(B)Iy‖2 = σ(B)‖y‖2.
Therefore, ‖ΣBV †Bx‖ ≥ σ(B). VA and UB are unitary so left-multiplying by them does not change
a vector’s norm. A similar argument as above shows that for any compatible vector y we have
‖ΣAy‖2 ≥ σ(A)‖y‖2. Lastly, multiplying by UA does not change the norm so we have for all unit-
norm vectors x, ‖UAΣAV †AUBΣBV †Bx‖2 ≥ σ(A)σ(B). The infimum over all such x must also obey
this lower bound. 2
Very similar reasoning can be applied to upper bound the maximum singular value of a product.
Corollary A.9 For all compatible matrices A and B, σ(AB) ≤ σ(A)σ(B).
On occasion, we will need to bound the maximum eigenvalue of the difference of two positive
semidefinite matrices. With no other information, the following lemma provides a crude bound
Lemma A.10 If X,Y ∈ Hn+ then
∣∣λ(X − Y )∣∣ ≤ max{λ(X), λ(Y )}.
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Proof Write the eigendecomposition of X = V ΛV −1. Then
λ(X)I −X = λ(X)V ΛV −1 − V ΛV −1 (A.30)
= V (λ(X)I − Λ)V −1, (A.31)
which implies λ(X)I − X  0. A similar statment can be made for Y : −λ(Y )I  −Y . By
supposition we have X − Y  Y and X − Y  X. Therefore we can assemble the following in
increasing Löwner orer: −λ(Y )I  −Y  X − Y  X  λ(X)I. This implies that the spectrum of
X − Y is entirely contained in the closed interval [−λ(Y ), λ(X)]. 2
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APPENDIX B
SIMULATION SOFTWARE
The simulations that test and verify the results in this dissertation were written in the Matlab
language and have been tested to run on Matlab versions from 7.1 to R2016a. This appendix
contains the various custom scripts, classes, and functions written by the author. Where possible,
built-in Matlab dependencies have been highlighted.
B.1 MIMOgame.m
This custom class represents a single instance of a MU-MIMO game as studied in this dissertation.
It’s non-native dependencies include
• BRu.m in Section B.2
• BRw.m in Section B.3
• GradPlay.m in Section B.4
classdef MIMOgame < matlab.mixin.Copyable
% A class for MIMO Gaussian IC games.
%
% Constructor: G = MIMOGame(L, jam, Nt, Nr)
% L Number of regular users
% jam 1 for jammer, 0 for non−jammer
% Nt Number of transmission antennae
% Nr Number of receiver antennae
properties
% L is the number of regular players.
L; jam;
Nt; Nr;
cbar;
ubar;
w;
H;
hasSolution = false;
Q0;
Qstar;
PlayHistory;
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end % properties
methods
% Constructor
function G = MIMOgame(NumUsers, JammerYN, Nt, Nr, varargin)
G.L = NumUsers;
G.jam = JammerYN;
G.Nt = Nt;
G.Nr = Nr;
if nargin == 5
G.cbar = varargin{1};
end
end % MIMOgame constructor
% Channel Generator
function generateH(G, varargin)
% Randomly generate channel matrices (populates MIMOgame.H).
%
% First optional argument: Overwrite with impunity [Boolean]
% [Default = false]
% Second optional argument: Zero crosstalk [Boolean] [Default =
% false]
overwrite_with_impunity = false;
zero_crosstalk_bool = false;
if nargin >= 2
overwrite_with_impunity = varargin{1};
if nargin == 3
zero_crosstalk_bool = varargin{2};
else
error('MIMOgame:generateH', 'Invalid number of input arguments.'
);
end
end
overwrite_approval = true;
if (~overwrite_with_impunity && ~isempty(G.H))
overwrite_approval = input('The game already has a channel matrix
defined. Are you sure you want to overwrite it? (This warning
can be skipped by setting the second argument to "1".)','s');
end
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if (~overwrite_approval || strcmpi(overwrite_approval, 'no'))
disp('MIMOgame:generateH operation cancelled.');
return
else
% OK let's do this.
for ii = 1:G.L+G.jam
for jj = 1:G.L+G.jam
if zero_crosstalk_bool && ii~=jj && jj ~= G.L+G.jam && ii ~=
G.L+G.jam
G.H{ii}{jj} = zeros(G.Nr,G.Nt);
else
G.H{ii}{jj} = randn(G.Nr,G.Nt) + 1j*randn(G.Nr,G.Nt);
end
end
end
end
end % generateH
% Action generator
function generateQ(G)
% Randomly generate initial actions (populates MIMOgame.Q0). Actions
will be
% normalized to satisfy power limits in G.cbar, if defined.
for m = 1:G.L+G.jam
G.Q0{m} = (randn(G.Nt,G.Nt) + 1j * randn(G.Nt,G.Nt)) / G.Nt;
G.Q0{m} = G.Q0{m} * G.Q0{m}';
% If no power limits are set, do not normalize.
if ~isempty(G.cbar) && trace(G.Q0{m}) > G.cbar(m)
G.Q0{m} = G.cbar(m)*G.Q0{m}/trace(G.Q0{m});
end
end
end % generateQ
% Utility
% Clear properties
function clearProp(G, varargin)
% Clear the properties listed as arguments. A single property
% can be the sole argument (as a string). Otherwise, multiple
% properties can be cleared by listing their names as strings,
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% then placing those strings in a cell array.
if isa(varargin{1},'char')
% clear the property labled in varargin{1}
G.clearMe(varargin{1});
elseif isa(varargin{1},'cell')
% iterate through cell and delete the properties
el = length(varargin{1});
for c = 1:el
G.clearMe(varargin{1}{c});
end
else
return;
end
end % clearProp
%% Solver
function BRu(G,varargin)
if ~isempty(varargin)
[cap, Qstar, conv, cap_hist] = BRu(G.L,G.cbar,G.H,G.Q0,varargin{1});
else
[cap, Qstar, conv, cap_hist] = BRu(G.L,G.cbar,G.H,G.Q0);
end
G.hasSolution = conv;
G.Qstar = Qstar;
G.PlayHistory = cap_hist;
end % BRu
function BRw(G,varargin)
if ~isempty(varargin)
[cap, Qstar, conv, cap_hist] = BRw(G.L,G.ubar,G.w,G.H,G.Q0,varargin
{1});
else
[cap, Qstar, conv, cap_hist] = BRu(G.L,G.ubar,G.w,G.H,G.Q0);
end
G.hasSolution = conv;
G.Qstar = Qstar;
G.PlayHistory = cap_hist;
end % BRw
function GP(G,varargin)
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%tol = 1e−5;
%alphafun = @(t) 1/t;
if ~isempty(varargin)
st = varargin{1};
%fn = fieldnames(st);
%optionalinputs = structvars(length(fn),st);
%eval(optionalinputs);
[cap, Qstar, conv, cap_hist] = GradPlay(G.L,G.cbar,G.H,G.Q0,st);
else
[cap, Qstar, conv, cap_hist] = GradPlay(G.L,G.cbar,G.H,G.Q0);
end
G.hasSolution = conv;
G.Qstar = Qstar;
G.PlayHistory = cap_hist;
end % GP
%% Helpers
function clearMe(G, st)
try
if isa(eval(['G.' st]),'cell')
eval(['G.' st '={};']);
else
eval(['G.' st '=[];']);
end
catch
warning('MIMOgame:clearProp',['Warning: No such property "' st '"
found']);
return;
end
end % clearMe
function Q = ActionGen(G,k)
% Generate a random action for player k \in [0,L]
% Generate a random PSD matrix.
X = rand(G.Nt);
Q = X*X';
% If it violates the power constraint, normalize it down.
switch k
case 0
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if trace(Q) > G.P0
Q = G.P0/trace(Q) * Q;
end
otherwise
if trace(Q) > G.P(k)
Q = G.P(k)/trace(Q) * Q;
end
end
end % ActionGen method
function d = ActionDelta(G)
try
lastact = G.PlayHistory(:,end);
prioract = G.PlayHistory(:,end−1);
d = 0;
for k = 1:length(lastact)
d = d + norm(lastact{k} − prioract{k});
end
catch ME
id = ME.identifier;
lastSeg = regexp(id,'\:','split');
if strcmp(lastSeg{end}, 'UndefinedFunction')
d = realmax;
elseif strcmp(lastSeg{end}, 'badsubscript')
d = realmax;
else
rethrow(ME);
end
end
end % ActionDelta method
function bool = ActionCheck(G,Q,k)
% Check validity of action Q for player k
bool = true;
E = eig(Q);
bool = bool && all(real(E) == E);
bool = bool && all(E >= 0);
if k == 0
bool = bool && (trace(Q) <= G.P0);
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else
bool = bool && (trace(Q) <= G.P(k));
end
end % ActionCheck method
end % methods
end % classdef
B.2 BRu.m
This custom function implements the best-response dynamics in the utility game described in Al-
gorithm 1. Its non-native dependencies include
• WF.m in Section B.5
• cal_capacity.m in Section B.6
• jammerBR.m in Section B.7
• row.m in Section B.8
% [cap, Qstar, conv, cap_hist] = BRu(L,cbar,H,Q,<struct>)
%
% INPUTS
% L − Number of users.
% cbar − Vector of cost constraints. cbar(L+1) is the jammer's
% constraint, if present.
% H − Cell array of cell arrays of channel matrices.
% Q − Initial joint action.
%
% OPTIONAL INPUT
% struct
% error_tol − Tolerance for judging convergence of actions. Default =
% 0.01.
% error_window− Number of iterations algorithm must be within tolerance
% in order for convergence to be concluded. Default = 10.
% plot_flag − Boolean regarding whether to output trajectory plot.
% Default = false.
% randomize_update − Boolean indicating whether within each iteration the
% order of player updates should be random (true) or in ascending numeric
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% order (false). Default = false.
%
% OUTPUTS
% cap − Vector of utilities at the end of the process.
% Qstar − Cell array of strategies at the end of the process.
% conv − Boolean regarding whether the process converged or not.
% hist − Structure
% cap − Array with utilities for users at each time step.
% cond − Array with condition numbers on the actions of each agent at
% each time step.
% action − Cell array with actions at each time step.
%
function [cap, Qstar, conv, hist] = BRu(L,cbar,H,Q,varargin)
%% Flag if jammer is present.
if length(Q) ~= L
jam = 1;
else
jam = 0;
end
%% Algorithm parameters.
dT = 1000; % Time limit
T0 = 1;
Tf = T0+dT;
ew = 10; % Default error window
eth = 0.01; % Default error tolerance
player_order = 1:L+jam; % Default player update order.
if ~isempty(varargin)
if isfield(varargin{1},'error_window')
ew = varargin{1}.error_window;
end
if isfield(varargin{1},'error_tol')
eth = varargin{1}.error_tol;
elseif isfield(varargin{1},'error_tolerance')
eth = varargin{1}.error_tolerance;
end
if isfield(varargin{1},'randomize_update')
player_order = randperm(L+jam);
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end
end
%% Initialize the history.
hist = struct('cap',{},'cond',{},'action',{});
hist(1).cap = cal_capacity(L,H,Q);
hist(1).cond = cellfun(@cond, Q);
hist(1).action = Q;
%% Run BR process.
for e = 0.1:0.2:1
for t = T0:Tf
inert = 1 * (1 − 1 / (t ^ e));
for m = player_order
if m == L+jam
Q{L+jam} = inert * Q{L+jam} + (1−inert) * jammerBR(L,cbar(L+1),H,Q);
else
Q{m} = inert * Q{m} + (1−inert) * WF(m,L,cbar,H,Q);
end
end
hist(end+1).cap = cal_capacity(L,H,Q);
hist(end).cond = cellfun(@cond,Q);
hist(end).action = Q;
if t > ew && norm(max([hist(:,t−ew+1:t).cap],[],2) ...
− min([hist(:,t−ew+1:t).cap],[],2)) < eth
conv = 1;
Qstar = Q;
cap = hist(end).cap;
if ~isempty(varargin) && isfield(varargin{1},'plot_flag')
figure; plot([hist.cap]');
xlabel('Iteration'); ylabel('Capacity');
title({'Mutual information trajectories for users. ';...
['Condition of final action matrices: ',num2str(row(round(hist(
end).cond)))]...
});
end
return;
end
end
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T0 = Tf+1;
Tf = T0+dT;
end
%% Fallback for processes that exceed time limit T.
disp('nonconvergent iteWF')
conv = 0;
end % −end BR−
B.3 BRw.m
This custom function implements the best-response dynamics in the weighted cost game described
in Algorithm 2. Its non-native dependencies include
• CVX, a package for specifying and solving convex programs [24]
• cal_capacity.m in Section B.6
• cal_power.m in Section B.9
• calc_R.m in Section B.10
• jammerBR.m in Section B.7
• row.m in Section B.8
% [util, Qstar, conv, obj_hist] = BRwPlus(L,ubar,w,H,Q,<param.struct>)
% Parameter Field −−− Possible values; Description
% plot true, {false}
% Plot trajectories?
% verbose true, {false}
% Print after every iteration?
% time <positive integer> {1000}
% Iteration limit per alpha exponent
% exponent <vector of positive fractions> {[.5]}
% After each segment of iterations defined by TIME expires,
the
% exponent on the inertia term is incremented to the next one
% in EXPONENT.
% window <positive integer> {5}
% Error window
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% tol <positive float> {0.01}
% Error tolerance for overall convergence.
function [util, Qstar, conv, obj_hist] = BRw(L,ubar,w,H,Q,varargin)
if ~isempty(varargin)
params = varargin{1};
end
%% Flag if jammer is present.
if length(Q) ~= L
jam = 1;
else
jam = 0;
end
%% Game parameters
[Nr, Nt] = size(H{1}{1});
%% Algorithm parameters.
exponent = 0.5;
dT = 1000; % Time limit
ew = 5; % Error window
eth = 0.01; % Error tolerance
if exist('params','var')
if isfield(params,'time')
dT = params.time;
end
if isfield(params,'exponent')
exponent = params.exponent;
end
if isfield(params,'window')
ew = params.window;
end
if isfield(params,'tol')
eth = params.tol;
end
end
T0 = 1;
Tf = T0+dT;
%% Initialize the objective history.
obj_hist = cal_power(L,Q);
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util_hist = cal_capacity(L,H,Q);
objective = zeros(L,1);
%% Run BR process
for e = exponent
for t = T0 : Tf
inert = 1*(1−1/(t^e));
for m = 1:L
R = calc_R(L,H,Q,m);
Ri = inv(R{m});
cvx_begin sdp quiet
variable X(Nt,Nt) hermitian
dual variable Y
minimize( trace(X) + w(m)*pos(ubar(m) − log2(exp(1))*log_det(eye(Nt) + X
* H{m}{m}' * Ri * H{m}{m}) ) )
Y: X>=0
cvx_end
if isempty(strfind(cvx_status,'Solved'))
conv = 0;
Qstar = Q;
util = util_hist(:,end);
if exist('params','var') && isfield(params,'plot') && params.plot
visual_output(conv,L,ubar,w,obj_hist,util_hist,t)
end
disp(['When trying to find the best response of player ',num2str(m),
' to '])
celldisp(Q);
disp('CVX resolved the following:');
disp(cvx_status);
return;
end
Q{m} = inert * Q{m} + (1−inert) * X;
end
if jam
Q{m+1} = inert * Q{m+1} + (1−inert) * jammerBR(L,−ubar(L+1),H,Q);
end
objective = cal_power(L,Q);
obj_hist = [obj_hist objective];
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util_hist = [util_hist, cal_capacity(L,H,Q)];
if t > ew && norm(max(obj_hist(:,t−ew+1:t),[],2) − min(obj_hist(:,t−ew+1:t)
,[],2)) < eth
conv = 1;
Qstar = Q;
util = util_hist(:,end);
if exist('params','var') && isfield(params,'plot') && params.plot
visual_output(conv,L,ubar,w,obj_hist,util_hist,t);
end
return;
elseif exist('params','var') && isfield(params,'verbose') && params.verbose
disp(['Iteration: ', num2str(t)]);
disp(['Time is ', datestr(clock,16)]);
end
end
T0 = Tf+1;
Tf = T0+dT;
end
%% Non−convergence
conv = 0;
Qstar = Q;
util = util_hist(:,end);
if exist('params','var') && isfield(params,'plot') && params.plot
visual_output(conv,L,ubar,w,obj_hist,util_hist,t)
end
%% Nested functions
end % −end BRc−
%% Subfunctions
function visual_output(flag,L,ubar,w,obj_hist,util_hist,finalT)
figure;
subplot(2,1,1);
plot(obj_hist');
title({'Power Trajectories for the Weighted Cost Game'; ['$\bar{u} = [$',num2str
(row(ubar)),'$]$, $w = [$',num2str(row(w)),'$]$']});
xlabel('Iteration'); ylabel('Transmission Power');
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axis([1, finalT, 0, 1.1*max(max(obj_hist))]);
subplot(2,1,2);
plot(util_hist');
hold on;
line(repmat([1;finalT],1,L),repmat(row(ubar(1:L)),2,1),'LineStyle','−−');
title('Mutual Information Trajectories');
xlabel('Iteration'); ylabel('Link Mutual Information');
axis([1, finalT, 0, 1.1*max([max(max(util_hist)), max(ubar)])]);
if flag
disp('The best−response dynamics converged');
else
disp('The best−response dynamics did NOT converge.');
end
end
B.4 GradPlay.m
This cusom function implements the gradient-play dynamics described in Algorithm 3. Its non-
native dependencies include
• cal_capacity.m in Section B.6
• calc_R.m in Section B.10
• row.m in Section B.8
% [cap, Qstar, conv, hist] = GradPlay(L,cbar,H,Q,<struct>)
%
% INPUTS
% L − Number of users.
% cbar − Vector of cost constraints. cbar(L+1) is the jammer's
% constraint, if present.
% H − Cell array of cell arrays of channel matrices.
% Q − Initial joint action.
%
% OPTIONAL INPUT
% struct
% plot − Boolean flag whether to plot trajectories. Default = false.
%
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% OUTPUTS
% cap − Vector of utilities at the end of the process.
% Qstar − Cell array of strategies at the end of the process.
% conv − Boolean regarding whether the process converged or not.
% hist − Structure
% cap − Array with utilities for users at each time step.
% cond − Array with condition numbers on the actions of each agent at
% each time step.
% action − Cell array with actions at each time step.
%
function [cap, Qstar, conv, hist] = GradPlay(L,cbar,H,Q,varargin)
if ~isempty(varargin)
params = varargin{1};
end
%% Flag if jammer is present.
if length(Q) ~= L
jam = 1;
else
jam = 0;
end
%% Algorithm parameters
gammabar = 0.5;
dT = 1000; % Time limit
T0 = 1;
Tf = T0+dT;
ew = 10; % Error window
eth = 0.001; % Error tolerance
%% Initialize the history.
hist = struct('cap',{},'cond',{},'action',{});
hist(1).cap = cal_capacity(L,H,Q);
hist(1).cond = cellfun(@cond, Q);
hist(1).action = Q;
%% Run Gradient Play process
% Larger exponents (e) produce smaller inertias (larger willingness to optimize) at
% any given time.
Nt = size(Q{1},1);
for e = .01:.02:.5
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for t = T0:Tf
gamma = gammabar;
inert = 1 * (1 − 1 / (t ^ e));
R = calc_R(L,H,Q);
for m = 1:L
grad{m} = H{m}{m}'*((R{m}+H{m}{m}*Q{m}*H{m}{m}')\eye(Nt))*H{m}{m}/log(2)
;
gradnorm(m,t) = norm(grad{m});
Q{m} = inert*Q{m} + (1−inert)*proj(Q{m}+gamma*grad{m},m);
end
if jam
m=L+1;
grad{m} = pseudogradientJammer();
gradnorm(m,t) = norm(grad{m});
Q{m} = inert*Q{m} + (1−inert)*proj(Q{m}+gamma*grad{m},m);
end
cap = cal_capacity(L,H,Q);
hist(end+1).cap = cal_capacity(L,H,Q);
hist(end).cond = cellfun(@cond,Q);
hist(end).action = Q;
if t > ew && ...
norm(max([hist(t−ew+1:t).cap],[],2) − min([hist(t−ew+1:t).cap],[],2)
) < eth && ...
all(max(gradnorm(:,t−ew+1:t),[],2)−min(gradnorm(:,t−ew+1:t),[],2) <
eth)
conv = 1;
Qstar = Q;
if exist('params','var') && isfield(params,'plot') && params.plot
visual_output(conv,cbar,[hist.cap],t);
end
return;
end
end
T0 = Tf+1;
Tf = T0+dT;
end
%% Fallback for processes that exceed time limit T.
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disp('nonconvergent GradPlay')
conv = 0;
Qstar = 0;
if exist('params','var') && isfield(params,'plot') && params.plot
visual_output(conv,cbar,[hist.cap],t);
end
%% Nested functions
function P = proj(F,k)
% Project F onto strategy set of user k.
[V,D] = eig(F);
D = real(D);
if trace(D)<=cbar(k)
P = V*D*V'; return;
end
[lam,ind] = sort(diag(D),'descend');
mu = (cbar(k)−transpose(cumsum(lam)))./(1:1:Nt);
M = repmat(lam,1,Nt)+repmat(mu,Nt,1);
M = M.*(M>0);
f = sum(M);
[mi,f_ind] = min(abs(f−cbar(k)));
if mi > 1e4*eps
warning('GradPlay:proj:musearch','The search for the best eigenvalue
offset is out of tolerance. Be careful.');
end
mustar = mu(f_ind);
rho = lam+mustar*ones(size(lam));
rho = rho.*(rho>0);
P = V(:,ind)*diag(rho)*V(:,ind)';
end % end proj
function dJ = pseudogradientJammer()
z = L+1;
Nt = size(Q{z},1);
dJ = 0;
for k = 1:L
Inter = 0;
for j = setdiff(1:L,k)
Inter = Inter + H{k}{j}*Q{j}*H{k}{j}';
80
end
First = eye(Nt) + H{k}{z}*Q{z}*H{k}{z}' + Inter + H{k}{k}*Q{k}*H{k}{k}';
Second = eye(Nt) + H{k}{z}*Q{z}*H{k}{z}' + Inter;
dJ = dJ+ H{k}{z}'*(First\eye(Nt) − Second\eye(Nt))*H{k}{z};
end
dJ = dJ/−log(2);
end % end pseudogradientJammer
end
%% Subfunctions
function visual_output(flag,cbar,obj_hist,finalT)
figure;
plot(obj_hist');
title({'Gradient Play Rate Trajectories for the Utility Game'; ['$\bar{c} = [$',
num2str(row(cbar)),'$]$']});
xlabel('Iteration'); ylabel('Link Mutual Information');
axis([1, finalT, 0, 1.1*max(max(obj_hist))]);
if flag
disp('The gradient−play dynamics converged');
else
disp('The gradient−play dynamics did NOT converge.');
end
end % end visual_output
B.5 WF.m
This custom function implements the water-filling optimization procedure for each user given the
actions of the other agents. It is adapted from the procedure mentioned in [2].
function Qbr = WF(player,L,cbar,H,Q)
m = player;
jam = length(Q)−L;
R = eye(size(H{m}{m},1));
for k = 1:L+jam
R = R + (k ~= m) * H{m}{k} * Q{k} * H{m}{k}';
end
[Ru,Rs,Rv] = svd(R);
[U,S,V] = svd(Ru * diag(diag(Rs).^−0.5) * Rv' * H{m}{m});
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lambda = nonzeros(diag(S)) .^ (−2);
ns = length(lambda);
if ns == 1
alpha = cbar(m);
elseif ns > 1
% Find the first index such that when mu is set to that lambda, the sum total
% water exceeds the limit.
idx = find(cbar(m) < [lambda(2:ns) .* (1:ns−1)' ...
− tril(ones(ns − 1,ns − 1)) * lambda(1:ns − 1); inf],1);
% Overestimate the area: power + sum of the heights.
% Then divide by the number of columns to get an overestimate of their proper
water depths.
% Perform max−with−zero operation to knock off any creepers.
% (Don't actually ever calculate the water depth, mu!)
alpha = max((cbar(m) + sum(lambda(1:idx))) / idx − lambda,0);
end
alpha = [alpha; zeros(size(H{m}{m},2) − length(alpha),1)];
Qbr = V * diag(alpha) * V';
B.6 cal_capacity.m
This subfunction evaluates the capacity (utility) of all users in the game.
% cal_capacity
%
% K. Clay McKell
% UH Manoa Electrical Engineering
% Wireless Power Simulation
%
% Calculate the mutual information for links in an interference channel.
%
% [ cap ] = cal_capacity( L, H, Q, [player_ids] )
%
% INPUTS
% L The number of players in the game.
% H 2−d cell array of the channel gain matrices.
% Q 1−d cell array of player actions (Gaussian covariance matrices).
%
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% OPTIONAL INPUTS
% player_ids Array containing indices of the players for which you wish to
% calculate the capacity. Default = 1:L.
%
% OUTPUTS
% cap Array containing the mutual information of each link (in bits/s/Hz). If any
% player was excluded (by specifying player_ids), then its capacity is reported as
% zero (0).
%
% VERSION HISTORY
%
function cap = cal_capacity(L,H,Q,varargin)
%% Flag if jammer is present.
if length(Q) ~= L
jam = 1;
else
jam = 0;
end
%% Check if we are only reporting for a single player.
p = 1:L;
if nargin == 4
p = varargin{1};
end
%% Carry on.
R = cell(L,1);
cap = zeros(L,1);
for m = 1:L
R{m} = eye(size(H{m}{m},1));
for k = 1:L+jam
R{m} = R{m} + (k ~= m) * H{m}{k} * Q{k} * H{m}{k}';
end
end
for m = p
cap(m) = real(log2(det(H{m}{m} * Q{m} * H{m}{m}' + R{m})) − log2(det(R{m})));
end
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B.7 jammerBR.m
This subfunction evaluates the jammer’s best response to a set of user actions. In general, a closed-
form expression for the solution to this problem does not exist. The built-in Matlab function
fmincon is used to numerically approximate the optimal solution. The non-native dependencies of
jammerBR include
• devec.m in Section B.11
• revec.m in Section B.12
function Q0br = jammerBR(L,pow_limit,H,Q)
% Jammer's Best Response is a nonlinear optimization.
Nt = size(Q{L+1},1);
opts = optimset('Algorithm', 'interior−point', ...
'MaxFunEvals', max([3000, Nt^Nt*1000]), ...
'Diagnostics', 'off', ...
'Display', 'off');
xbr = fmincon(@(x)jammerUtil(x), revec(Q{L+1}), ...
[ones(1,Nt) zeros(1,Nt*(Nt−1))], pow_limit, ...
[], [], ...
[], [], ...
@(x)nlconstraint(x), ...
opts);
Q0br = devec(xbr);
function U = jammerUtil(x)
% Nested Function: Calculate jammer's utility for vectorized action x.
R = cell(L,1);
U = 0;
for kk = 1:L
R{kk} = eye(size(H{kk}{kk},1));
for jj = 1:L+1
R{kk} = R{kk} + (jj~=kk) * H{kk}{jj} * Q{jj} * H{kk}{jj}';
end
R{kk} = R{kk} + H{kk}{L+1} * devec(x) * H{kk}{L+1}';
u = real(log2(det(H{kk}{kk} * Q{kk} * H{kk}{kk}' + R{kk})) − log2(det(R{
kk})));
U = U + u;
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end
end % −end jammerUtil−
function [c ceq] = nlconstraint(x)
% Nested Function: Calculate the eigenvalues of matrix−ed action vector x
% for use in nonlinear constraint parameter.
Q0 = devec(x);
c = −1*eig(Q0);
ceq = [];
end % −end nlconstraint−
end % −end jammerBR−
B.8 row.m
This simple function ensures its argument is a row vector.
function rowv = row(v)
%
% K. Clay McKell
% 17 December 2009 − Initial release.
% 14 November 2009 v2.0 − Use transpose instead of conjugate transpose.
%
% ROW
% rowv = row(v)
% Ensure a vector is a row vector.
%
% INPUT:
% v Vector (1−dimensional array) that will be output as a row vector.
%
% OUTPUT:
% rowv Vector v in row format.
%
s = size(v);
if min(s) ~= 1
error('Input is not a vector');
elseif s(1) ~= 1
rowv = transpose(v);
else
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rowv=v;
end
B.9 cal_power.m
This subfunction evaluates the power used (cost) of all users in the game.
function cost = cal_power(L,Q)
cost = zeros(L,1);
for m = 1:L
cost(m) = trace(Q{m});
end
B.10 calc_R.m
This subfunction evaluates the noise-plus-interference matrix Rk(Q).
function R = calc_R(L,H,Q,varargin)
%% Flag if jammer is present
if length(Q) ~= L
jam = 1;
else
jam = 0;
end
%% Check which players we are calculating for
p=1:L;
if nargin == 4
p = varargin{1};
end
R = cell(length(p),1);
for m = p
R{m} = eye(size(H{m}{m},1));
for k = 1:L+jam
R{m} = R{m} + (k ~= m) * H{m}{k} * Q{k} * H{m}{k}';
end
end
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B.11 devec.m
This helper function converts the independent entries of a complex Hermitian matrix into a real
column vector. Its only non-native dependency is row in Section B.8.
function M = devec(v)
% v is partitioned into Diagonal, Upper Triangular Real, and Upper Triangular
Imaginary parts:
% v = [vdiag; vreals; vimags].
% vdiag contains the L real diagonal components.
% vreals and vimags contains the L(L−1)/2 STRICTLY off−diagonal components of
the
% upper triangular part of Q:
% vreals = Re([Q_12; ...; Q_1L; Q_23; ...; Q_2L; ...; Q_(L−1,L)]).
n = length(v);
L = sqrt(n);
vdiag = v(1:L);
vreal = v(L+1:L+L*(L−1)/2);
UTreal = detri(vreal);
vimag = v(1+L+L*(L−1)/2:end);
UTimag = detri(vimag);
M = diag(vdiag) + UTreal + 1j*UTimag + ctranspose(UTreal + 1j*UTimag);
end
function UT = detri(v)
% Turn v into a strictly upper triangular matrix.
m = length(v);
L = (1+sqrt(1+8*m))/2;
UT = zeros(L);
for ii = 1:L−1
UT(ii,ii+1:L) = row(v(1:L−ii));
v = v(L+1−ii:end);
end
end
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B.12 revec.m
This helper function converts the independent entries of a complex Hermitian matrix from a real
column vector to a square complex matrix.
function v = revec(X)
L = size(X,1);
d = diag(X);
im = imag(X);
re = real(X);
n = L*(L−1)/2;
vim = zeros(n,1);
vre = vim;
count = 0;
for r = 1:L−1
for c = r+1: L
count = count+1;
vim(count) = im(r,c);
vre(count) = re(r,c);
end
end
v = [d; vre; vim];
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